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Uniform International Tax Collection and Distribution for Global Development, a *(**)topian 
BEPS Alternative 
Henry Ordower, Professor of Law1
Saint Louis University School of Law 
INTRODUCTION
International tax reform projects, including the OECD’s2 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(“BEPS”) iterations,3 seek to collect additional tax from multi-national enterprises (“MNEs”) 
under rubrics of fairer taxation. The reform projects propose various methods of reallocating 
income that taxpayers have sourced to low and no tax jurisdictions to affluent developed 
economies for those economies to tax under their own taxing rules. The reallocations would 
concentrate the bulk of incremental tax revenue into the treasuries of affluent developed 
economies.  
This article maintains that the need to prevent taxpayers from avoiding payment of a fair tax 
amount should not result in additional tax revenue primarily for the economically developed 
economies. Arguments that the right to tax belongs to the developed economies are largely 
political, not moral. The arguments lack persuasive force in a world of unequal distribution of 
wealth and resources with which to generate wealth.4 Rather fairer tax collection should yield 
incremental revenue to eliminate poverty and improve living conditions for all people 
worldwide. Current international tax reform projects fail to address world poverty adequately.   
The article proposes as an alternative to other international projects the creation of an 
international taxing agency to substitute for national taxing agencies worldwide. The 
international taxing agency would target elimination of world poverty. The new agency would 
have full authority to collect income taxes from entities and individuals under uniform 
international, rather than disparate national, taxing rules and procedures and to distribute the 
revenue worldwide. This international taxing agency would render obsolete most or all 
1 A.B. Washington University; M.A., J.D. The University of Chicago. I am grateful to Hannah Meehan, a 3rd year 
law student at Saint Louis University School of Law, for outstanding research and facilitating the progress of this 
paper. Thanks also to David Kullman, a librarian and library liaison, and Joel Ocampo, a recent graduate from Saint 
Louis University School of Law, for additional research assistance and to the attendees at the presentation of an 
earlier draft of this paper at the Law and Society 2020 virtual conference. Special thanks to Allison Christians for 
her time in wading through an earlier draft of this paper to provide indispensable suggestions. 
2 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is a member organization with 37 developed 
countries as members, with Colombia joining in April 2020. OECD, List of OECD Member countries - Ratification 
of the Convention on the OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/document/list-oecd-member-countries.htm (last visited 
May 21, 2020). 
3 Discussion infra part III. 
4 Discussion infra part IV. 
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international tax reform projects and eliminate the need for most or all tax treaties and tax 
information exchange agreements. 
Uniform rules and rates applicable to all income worldwide without regard to the source, 
residence or market from or in which the income is produced will facilitate the collection of an 
aggregate worldwide tax greater in amount than that currently collected by all the fragmented, 
national tax collection. Unlike existing national tax systems, the tax, owing to its uniformity, 
does not favor some taxpayers over others.  
Since the global tax will increase tax revenue collection materially, distribution initially might 
follow a two-step formula. The first step would hold each country harmless from tax revenue 
loss so that following transition to the global tax, each country receives a share of tax revenue 
equal to its revenue from income tax in the preceding year, or an average of several years 
collections, possibly adjusted for inflation, and enable each country to maintain its infra- and 
superstructure. The second step would follow a needs-based assessment under which the 
nutrition, housing, education, healthcare and infrastructure needs of less developed countries 
would be evaluated and a plan developed to ameliorate deficits in all categories worldwide. The 
agency would distribute incremental tax revenue pursuant to that plan. The second step would 
devote incremental revenue to the gradual elimination of those deficits -- perhaps addressing life-
threatening deficits first followed by improvement of living standards everywhere. Tax revenue 
thus transferred to non-affluent, developing economies initially would be small relative to the 
amount of revenue distributed under the first step to enable developed economies to maintain 
their existing infra- and superstructures but poverty amelioration costs would be moderated as a 
function of relative local cost of goods and labor. Nevertheless, the amount of tax revenue 
devoted to international poverty relief would be far greater than the minimal amounts developed 
economies currently contribute to world poverty eradication.5
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I contextualizes the problem of base erosion against revenue 
collection and distribution and provides an overview of the international taxing issues this article 
addresses. Part II considers a US regional context as a microcosm in which multiple and often 
overlapping taxing jurisdictions compete for revenue and investment. Some seek to capture 
additional revenue by annexing high tax yield property, and others with extra-tax and, at times, 
predatory revenue collection. Many exchange tax concessions for development and highlight the 
problems of tax competition and proliferating taxing jurisdictions even in the face of centralized 
tax collection. This part presents a relatively complex proxy for the revenue-raising problems 
confronting multiple taxing jurisdictions that fail to coordinate their efforts despite the umbrella 
of a larger governmental unit to which they belong.  Part III reviews a variety of proposals and 
related commentary – BEPS, GLoBE, CCCTB – highlighting the difficulty of harmonization in 
the face of tax competition and relentless industry pressure for tax-favored treatment.  Part IV 
5 Infra note 43 and accompanying text and part IV. 
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introduces the factor of relative and absolute poverty and regional development needs that 
contribute to the proliferation of taxing concessions in exchange for international investment, 
even where the benefit from the inbound investment is compromised by the loss of potential tax 
revenue and the corrupt reallocation of the potential revenue into private hands. Part V envisions 
relinquishment of national tax sovereignty in favor of an international taxing agency with the 
power to assess and collect tax at a uniform rate or rates under uniform international taxing rules 
without regard to source, residence or sales. It would base the authority to tax on multiple 
independent factors so that virtually all income is included and taxed in the worldwide base the 
international agency administers. Part VI recommends negotiation of revenue shares to dissuade 
regions from tax competition. It also suggests constructing a framework for formulaic revenue 
distribution based on relative economic need, including the maintenance of existing 
infrastructures. Part VII concludes and acknowledges that the project proposes the construction 
of a “topia” for taxation of MNEs, with the“u” or “dys” depending on individual perspectives. 
PART I: CONTEXTUALIZING THE GLOBAL TAXING PROBLEM
As corporations grew and increased their cross-border reach through the twentieth century, they 
adapted to doing business in multiple jurisdictions under a single enterprise umbrella. Such 
MNEs centralized their management, notwithstanding national borders. Many were sufficiently 
flexible to disperse management functions by operation or geography to maximize profitability 
although all functions remained answerable to central management.6 The MNE’s international 
business models enabled them to situate operations where costs were lowest or regional features 
most favorable for specific business functions. MNEs flexed their economic muscle to encourage 
robust, inter-jurisdictional and international competition for their investment. From time to time, 
the competition became destructive to the host jurisdiction as fervor to meet such competition 
sometimes caused the host jurisdiction to relinquish resources exceeding the benefits received 
from the investment. Taxation became a mainstay of that competition. MNEs demanded and 
received tax concessions from a jurisdiction before making or increasing their investments in the 
jurisdiction.  
Governments have not been nearly so nimble in adjusting their tax systems to capture revenue 
from the MNEs. Neither have governments adopted a unified or harmonized approach to 
taxation, even though compromising their taxing sovereignty with harmonized tax rules and 
procedures might yield better tax revenue production. Instead, tax competition has trended both 
on project-specific items as a substitute for direct subsidies and, on the broader scale, to 
6 OECD, Multinational Enterprises in The Global Economy, Heavily Debated but Hardly Measured, (May 2018) 
https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/MNEs-in-the-global-economy-policy-note.pdf (activities undertaken by foreign 
affiliated MNEs grew by 13 trillion USD between 2000 and 2014); Mark J. Perry, Large US Firms Sell, Hire and 
Invest More Overseas Than in US and They Have to Think Globally to Survive, AEI (Dec. 4, 2016) 
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/unctad-2.png (US Based companies in the World’s top 100 
multinational companies have foreign assets accounting for 23.8 to 82.4% of their total assets, and foreign 
employment accounting for 23.8 to 87.9% of their total employment).  
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encourage relocation of some or all of the MNE’s activities from higher tax jurisdictions to 
jurisdictions that would offer substantially lower or even zero tax rates in exchange for 
investment. And it is not only MNEs to which nations have offered tax-based investment 
incentives. Jurisdictions commonly offer immigrant or resident visas to investors7 and have 
begun to include temporary tax holidays as additional immigration incentives.8
Higher tax jurisdictions have not conceded their right to tax the MNEs, but they have found 
resourceful tax planners and competitive taxing jurisdictions to be formidable foes. Efforts to 
overcome tax competition and planning have enjoyed limited success. Regarding the income tax, 
combatting tax planning and tax competition (with some exceptions)9 has been largely national. 
Some tools that legislatures and tax administrators deploy to staunch loss of revenue from 
competition, general anti-avoidance rules, for example, have been enacted into law in similar 
forms in numerous jurisdictions,10 reflecting legislative willingness to borrow tax concepts from 
other jurisdictions and adapt them to address challenging problems.11
The OECD has assumed the lead in the international tax arena and, for the past several decades, 
has supplemented tax treaties12 with other multinational tools for tax collectors to share tax 
information in the form of similar, but more limited, international agreements.13 As in the case of 
treaties,14 exchange of information through tax agency cooperation may facilitate prosecuting tax 
offenders. More recently, the OECD introduced and developed several projects designed to 
7 Leila Adim, Between Benefit and Abuse: Immigrant Investment Programs, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 121 (2017); 
Allison Christians, Buying In: Residence and Citizenship by Investment, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 51 (2017) (both articles 
discussing “golden visas” for investors). 
8 Italy, for example. Raul-Angelo Papotti  and Lorenzo Ferro, Italy’s Attractive New Tax Regime for Wealthy 
Pensioners, 94 TAX NOTES INT'L 443 (Apr. 29, 2019); Marco Q. Rossi, Italy’s Special Tax Regime for High-Net-
Worth Individuals, Three Years In, 98 TAX NOTES INT'L 1145 (June 8, 2020). 
9 See discussion in part III infra. 
10 General Anti-avoidance Rules (“GAARS”) have become commonplace although effective use of them has been 
limited.  Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble, Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance Rules to Combat Tax 
Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law? A Comparative Study, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 21 (2010) (discussing 
various GAARs). The US does not have a GAAR but the statutory economic substance rule in I.R.C. §7701(o) 
operates similarly to other countries’ GAARs and requires that a transaction have economic substance independent 
of its tax benefits. Similarly, controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) anti-avoidance rules similar to those in section 
951 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code,” 26 USC § or “I.R.C.” followed by § and a 
number) have been enacted in several jurisdictions. 
11 Anthony Infanti, The Ethics of Tax Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 251 (2003) (identify risks of transferring tax rules 
from developed to less developed economies).  
12 For example, Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Can., Sep. 26, 1980, 1469 U.N.T.S. 
189, as amended Sep. 26, 1980, 2121 U.N.T.S. 364 available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/canada.pdf (last 
visited July 10, 2020). 
13 OECD, Tax Information Exchange Agreements (“TIEA”), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm (last visited June 17, 2020) (providing a model agreement 
and a listing of TIEAs through May 2012); OECD, Global Forum for Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, Automatic Exchange Portal,  http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/ (last visited June 17, 
2020) (portal for automatic exchange of tax information under the common reporting standard (“CRS”) for 
obtaining information from financial institutions and exchanging it with other jurisdictions).  
14 E.g., Art. XXVII of U.S.-Can. Tax Treaty, supra note 12, enables exchange of criminal tax information. 
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identify and capture individuals’ and MNEs’ income that they have assigned artificially to low 
tax jurisdictions.15 In one project, the OECD sought to coerce low tax jurisdictions to step back 
from encouraging taxpayers to move investment from high tax jurisdictions to low tax ones and 
to cooperate in exchanging tax information so that jurisdictions could tax their resident taxpayers 
on income received in other jurisdictions where appropriate.16 The OECD developed a list of un-
cooperative tax havens and gradually removed jurisdictions from the list as they agreed to 
respect OECD standards of transparency and exchange of information.17 It removed the last three 
countries, Andorra, Monaco and Liechtenstein, from the list in May 2009.18 The European Union 
(“EU”) maintains its own active list of uncooperative tax jurisdictions that currently includes 
eleven island jurisdictions and Oman.19
More recent projects focus on MNE revenue and seek to reallocate the revenue from the source 
to which the taxpayer has assigned it to a higher tax jurisdiction under sourcing rules designed to 
diminish the ability of taxpayers to shift profit artificially from high to low tax jurisdictions.20 A 
working group under the European Commission introduced a voluntary proposal for a common 
consolidated corporate tax basis (“CCCTB”) that, if adopted, would apportion the income of 
MNEs formulaically and predictably among the EU states in which it is operating.21 After tabling 
the proposal earlier, the EC renewed the proposal in 2015 as a mandatory base with a gradual 
introduction.22 The EU also has become more attentive to the state aid issues prohibited by the 
15 Part III, infra. 
16 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition An Emerging Global Issue, (1998), 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/harmful/1904176.pdf  (identifying harmful tax practices and tax havens to encourage 
developed countries to abandon the practices and impose sanctions on tax haven jurisdictions facilitating secret 
investment from residents of developed economies using tax havens to avoid home country taxes).  
17 OECD, List of Unco-operative Tax Havens, https://www.oecd.org/countries/monaco/list-of-unco-operative-tax-
havens.htm (last visited June 17, 2020); but see Michael J. McIntyre, How to End the Charade of Information 
Exchange, Tax Notes International (Oct, 26,, 2009) 255, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-
international/treaties/how-end-charade-information-exchange/2009/10/26/7918966 (debunking the effectiveness of 
the Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement as a basis on which to remove jurisdictions from the list of tax 
havens, characterizing the U.S. – Switzerland agreement as changing little of the Swiss bank secrecy-based 
assistance to international tax cheats, and proposing an alternative TIEA). 
18 Id. 
19 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (“EC”), Taxation: EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-list-of-non-cooperative-jurisdictions/ (Feb. 27, 2020 update), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020XG0227(01) (last visited July 10, 2020). 
20 OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited July 10, 2020), 
discussed infra part III; Devereux, Michael P. et al., The OECD Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, 1-2, Oxford 
Centre for Business Taxation (Jan. 2020) (digital commerce but emphasizing the OECD commitment to distribute a 
larger share of the tax base to developing economies).
21 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM (2011) 121 
final (Oct. 6, 2011), available at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2011/EN/1-2011-121-EN-F2-1.Pdf.  
22 EC, Questions and Answers on the CCCTB re-launch,  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5174 (last visited June 17, 2020). 
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Treaty23 when its member states grant non-uniform tax concessions to enterprises to provide a 
welcoming tax environment for them.24
Whether the target of legislation or multinational (OECD) project is the individual,25 the MNE,26
or both,27 the legislative or project objective almost invariably is to measure income and source 
in a manner that disregards artificial or manipulative sourcing. A frequent indicium of such 
artificiality or manipulation is a related party transaction where the parties are in different taxing 
jurisdictions28 and the pricing shifts profit to low or no-tax jurisdictions. While reallocation of 
income by the tax collector under existing transfer pricing regulations and guidelines currently is 
possible,29 the members of the OECD view transfer pricing to be inadequate to the task of 
restraining erosion of the tax base and its accompanying profit shifting. Underlying the 
reallocation process is the perception that the individual or MNE is manipulating income source 
and underpaying tax rather than simply paying tax to the wrong jurisdiction. However, with the 
possible exception of the CCCTB which would apportion the income tax base among the EU 
countries in which the MNE operates under a uniform set of rules in an endeavor to prevent 
double taxation and no taxation of income,30 an objective shared with most tax treaties,31 the 
international projects developed by the OECD and national anti-avoidance rules32 reallocate 
income to the developed economies with relatively high corporate tax rates33 rather than to less 
23 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union art. 107, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 
115) 47. 
24 EC, Competition, State Aid Control, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html (last 
visited July 10, 2020).  
25 The Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”), Pub L 111-147, 124 Stat 97 (March 22, 2010) (imposing 
penalties for failure to report foreign accounts and income and imposing sanctions on foreign financial institutions 
for failing to report accounts of US persons); I.R.C. § 877A (expatriation tax on US persons who relinquish 
citizenship or permanent residence in the US), for example. 
26 I.R.C. § 7874 (2018) (taxing inverting entities that cease to be US entities); CCCTB, supra note 21, BEPS, supra
note 17, for example. 
27 Controlled Foreign Corporation (“CFC”) provisions under I.R.C. § 951 et seq. in the US and similar provisions in 
other countries (taxing some or all corporate income to the corporation’s shareholders), GAARs, supra note 10, for 
example. 
28 Compare reallocation of income and deduction under I.R.C. § 482, for example, and the base erosion minimum 
tax under I.R.C. § 59A in the US. And similarly the disallowance of deductions in hybrid transactions when not 
matched with an inclusion. I.R.C. §267A. 
29 I.R.C. § 482 and the treasury regulations to I.R.C. § 482 (transfer price reallocation of tax items). 
30 Supra note 21. 
31 Tax treaties include prevention of double taxation among other functions in their title. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 99-106 (K. P. Sauvant and L. E. 
Sachs eds., 2009).  
32 CFC provisions, supra note 27, for example. 
33 High rates of tax is a relative term. The US reduced its corporate income tax rate from a maximum of 35% to 
21% in 2018 and imposed a maximum rate of 50% as recently as 1985. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) Pub. L. No. 
115-97 (2017); 26 U.S.C. § 5 (1982); Tax Foundation, Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates, Income Years 1909-
2012 (July 6, 2012), https://taxfoundation.org/federal-corporate-income-tax-rates-income-years-1909-2012/.  
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developed or developing economies. While the OECD projects purport to be neutral in 
identifying correct income source, reallocation favors the developed economy jurisdictions. 
From the OECD approach, one concludes that the underpayment of tax is significant because it 
deprives the treasury of a developed economy of tax revenue owed to it. If the projects increase 
the tax revenue of developed economies, however, they are likely to decrease investment that 
less developed economies may have captured with low taxes and tax incentives. 
For all taxpayers, including MNEs, the level of taxation may be a key but not the only economic 
factor in the analysis of where to earn income. Choosing where to locate income-producing 
activity is a bundle of factors, some economic and some non-economic. Tax rules often are 
ambiguous and economically favor certain jurisdictions, but the ambiguity also might lead to 
multiple tax impositions. Tax rules are not alone in their ambiguity. The location of income-
producing activity is also ambiguous, even more so today, when intangible, digital property 
produces income without any clear link to a specific and identifiable source, even with a single 
factor of destination of consumption as determinative. Destination is an inadequate proxy for 
taxing all income insofar as it concentrates income in the high consuming destinations.34
Similarly, residence of the income producer often is uncertain and residence of the owners of an 
income producing entity may not be more certain as one must unpeel possible layers of 
ownership.35 While taxpayers may complain that the tax rules are uncertain, they exploit the 
ambiguity of income source to locate income where the level of taxation is lowest rather than 
where income-producing activity takes place. Splitting genuine economic activity source from 
tax source enables taxpayers to minimize taxation artificially without there being certainty as to a 
single genuine source. Competing, legitimate claims of source may belong to multiple 
jurisdictions. Undoubtedly the income should be taxable somewhere. Ideally, if all income 
everywhere were subject to identical tax rules and rates, the taxpayer would be indifferent as to 
income source and would make location decisions based on non-tax factors. 
34 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Destination Based Corporate Tax: An Alternative Approach, (December 11, 2016). U of 
Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-028; U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 529. Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2883835 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2883835 (last visited July 10, 2020); 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, and Kimberly A. Clausing, Problems with Destination-Based Corporate Taxes and the Ryan 
Blueprint, (February 5, 2017). U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-029. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2884903 (last visited July 10, 2020); SALES FACTOR, Sales Factor Formulary 
Apportionment of Global Profits as an Alternative System of Taxation of to the Current U.S. Federal Corporate 
Income Tax (memorandum to the Senate Finance Committee), (April 13, 2015); , 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sales%20Factor_Redacted3.pdf; but see, Wei Cui, Destination-
Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal, 63 U. Toronoto. L.J 301 (2017) (critical analysis of destination-
based cash flow taxation confirming concentration of income in developed economies to exclusion of developing 
economies).  
35 Robert J Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen Shay, Defending Worldwide Taxation with a Shareholder-
Based Definition of Corporate Residence, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1681 (2016).. 
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Commentators have expressed concern that enhanced tax capture from MNEs favors the 
advanced economies unduly.36 Those commentators who critique the income shift for taxing 
purposes to developed economy jurisdictions argue that the BEPS projects fail to allocate a 
sufficiently large share of the income tax base to less-developed jurisdictions. This literature 
suggests other “fairer” methods for allocating or apportioning the tax base. One approach 
recommends a modified view of value creation and suggests allocating more of the base to where 
value is created.37 Another offers a method of formulary apportionment of the income tax base 
that includes a labor factor in the formula, not as a function of wages, but rather as a function of 
person-hours of work to prevent wage differentials from distorting apportionment formulas in 
favor of high wage countries.38 A third would allocate tax base by the benefit received by 
investment destination rather than benefit received from the destination by the investor.39
The goal for the OECD and the governments in developed economies has been one primarily of 
sourcing income to the developed economy so that it may be taxed there under that jurisdiction’s 
taxing rules. The more general proposition that each MNE (and each individual, as well) should 
pay an identifiable and specific portion of their income in tax without regard to which nation 
receives the tax has not been prominent. If worldwide agreement on an ideal amount of tax and 
uniform tax rules were possible, as this article will recommend, rather than the sourcing or 
missourcing of income, the next step would be allocation of the tax revenue among jurisdictions. 
Artificial sourcing would not alter the amount of tax payable by any taxpayer or related group of 
taxpayers.  
While fairness certainly underlies the OECD’s BEPS projects, fairness there has been primarily 
an income source concept, maintaining that if income is attributable to a source, the source has 
priority in imposing its tax. Even under the US’s worldwide taxation of its citizens and 
residents,40 the US has ceded taxing authority to the income source country through the foreign 
tax credit.41 Existing concepts of source favor developed economies. Unless some innovative 
source concept might compensate for imbalances in opportunities and resources worldwide by 
imputing more level distribution of opportunities and resources and taxing income according to 
that imputed source, a different manner of allocating worldwide taxing opportunity is critical to 
enable non-affluent nations and regions to develop and provide a reasonable standard of living to 
all people free from need.   
36 Devereaux, et al., supra note 20 and notes 37-39 infra and accompanying text. 
37 Allison Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn, Taxing Income Where Value is Created, 22 FLA. TAX. REV. 1 
(2018).
38 Henry Ordower, Utopian Visions toward a Grand Unified Global Income, Tax, 14 FLA. TAX. REV. 361, 387 
(2013) (labor factor in the income apportionment formula based on person hours of work rather than payroll 
amounts).
39 Vasiliki Koukoulioti, The Benefit Principle Revisited - Avoiding the Repercussions of Digitalization on the Tax 
Base Sustainability (Ph.D. dissertation in process, draft manuscript of June 1, 2020 on file with the author). 
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (taxing US citizens and residents on their income from all sources worldwide). 
41 I.R.C. § 901 (credit for income taxes properly paid in another jurisdiction). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648330
Ordower, Uniform International Tax Collection for Global Development Page 9 
It would be a significant conceptual shift to jettison the competitive concept of source as the 
primary basis for international income taxation and adopt the more nuanced and collaborative 
needs-based system this article proposes. Despite the developed economies’ income productivity, 
such a tax system would emphasize non-geographic fairness in the distribution of resources. The 
international community would unite on tax principles to prevent tax base erosion independent of 
source taxation so that the principles would not overwhelmingly favor the advanced economies.  
Instead, the objective of the tax system would be to generate adequate governmental resources to 
meet worldwide revenue demands.42 Currently, developed economies devote less than one 
percent of their tax revenue to development for less developed economies.43 International 
uniformity would require MNEs (and other taxpayers) to pay some reasonable amount of tax on 
their income and facilitate devotion of a larger amount of tax revenue to international 
development.   
The focus of the tax principles would be on the question of whether a definable, correct set of tax 
rules might exist under which each taxpayer pays a “fair” amount of tax without regard to the 
jurisdictions in which the taxpayer operates. This paper emphasizes the question of whether, 
assuming a “fair” measure of tax exists, distribution of that “fair” amount among jurisdictions 
ought to follow determinations of need with the elimination of suffering – starvation, disease, 
homelessness – at the forefront rather than the place of production of income. The imposition of 
tax can be along ability to pay principles, while distribution would follow contextualized need. 
This paper recommends abandoning the premise that income and accompanying tax revenue, 
however it is measured, be allocated to where the income is produced, in favor of allocating tax 
revenue based on a broad, inclusive view of revenue that is need-determined to accommodate the 
systemic transition. Developed economies would continue to have the greatest needs to meet 
their existing commitments and maintain existing infra- and superstructures. Yet, the shift in 
distribution principles would help address the uneven worldwide distribution of resources and 
level disparities between affluent and non-affluent taxpayers and communities, especially those 
disparities resulting in the absolute poverty prevalent in some parts of the world that generate 
42 Modern monetary theory postulates that some countries, the US included, simply could print money as needed 
without collecting tax at all. Scott Fullwiler , Modern Monetary Theory—A Primer on the Operational Realities of 
the Monetary System, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723198 (visited July 25, 
2020); Bell, Stephanie A., Can Taxes and Bonds Finance Government Spending?. Levy Economics Institute 
Working Paper No. 244, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=115128 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.115128. The coronavirus known as 
Covid19, Cucinotta D, Vanelli M, WHO Declares COVID-19 a Pandemic, 91 Acta Bio. Med. 157 (Mar, 19, 2020), 
is testing this modern monetary theory proposition insofar as the US Congress already has allocated over $2 trillion 
of funds and increased the national debt substantially to meet the national revenue needs from the contraction of the 
economy. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”), PUB. L. 116-138 (March 27, 
2020). 
43 Alexis Brassey & Henry Ordower, The Village of Billionaires: Fair Taxation and Redistribution Amid Relative 
and Absolute Poverty, 99 TAX NOTES INT'L 97 (July 6, 2020) (debunking the issue of fair taxation as politics rather 
than concern with fair taxation). 
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little income.44 The revised system would preclude MNE’s from using their economic bargaining 
power to negotiate tax relief from developing economies that cannot replace the lost revenue 
easily. 
Consistent with uniform tax rules and a fair rate of tax is the frequent assertion by representatives 
of MNEs that MNEs do not seek to reduce their taxes artificially,45 but plan the placement of 
their income to avoid becoming subject to tax on the same unit46 of income in multiple 
jurisdictions. Source planning also may protect MNEs from suffering a tax-based, competitive 
disadvantage. As long as the MNE does not pay tax while its competitors avoid tax leaving the 
MNE at a competitive disadvantage, the MNEs are indifferent to reasonable levels of taxation. 
Transparent and uniform tax rules would enable the MNEs to determine their tax liability to each 
jurisdiction correctly. Uniform rules would require the MNE’s competitors similarly to pay a 
correct amount of tax to each jurisdiction. Taxpayers must not be subject to non-uniform tax 
rules in any taxing jurisdiction.47 Yet, even if tax rules and rates are uniform within a taxing 
jurisdiction, they are not currently uniform across jurisdictions, and MNEs deploy considerable 
resources to minimizing their taxes whether as a competitive defense or as profit-centered 
activity.48
Harmonization of taxation internationally under the rubric of a universally correct level of tax is 
elusive. Efforts to achieve consensus on combatting tax avoidance may lead to some multi-
national agreements, but if each signatory gets to apply its own tax rules and interpretations to 
the agreement, the force of the agreement diminishes. National sovereignty remains a 
formidable, albeit primarily rhetorical,49 barrier to the best resolution of many issues common to 
44 Id.
45 Ryan Finley, Uber Accepts Need for New International Tax System, TAXNOTES (June 26, 2020), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/digital-economy/uber-accepts-need-new-international-tax-
system/2020/06/26/2cnmn?highlight=Pillar%201 (Uber acknowledges that international tax principles are necessary 
and simply hopes for less arbitrary measures); Adrian Weckler & Michael Cogley, ‘No one did anything wrong here 
and Ireland is being picked on... It is total political crap’ - Apple chief Tim Cook, INDEPENDENT.IE (Sep. 1, 2016), 
https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/no-one-did-anything-wrong-here-and-ireland-is-being-picked-on-it-is-
total-political-crap-apple-chief-tim-cook-35012145.html (Apple CEO stating that the tax system should be reformed 
and simplified, and that the EU ruling against the company was simply a political tactic as they were tax compliant 
and paid $400 million in 2014). In a recent ruling by the General Court of the European Union, the Court overruled 
the EC’s decision as it found that it had not met the legal standard necessary to show that there was an economic 
advantage (state aid) as required by Article 107(1) TFEU. Case T-778/16 and T-892/16, Ireland v. Comm’n, 2020. 
46 Except when referring to specific US tax provisions for which the US dollar will be used, “unit” of income is the 
income measured in the functional currency of the income producing entity. 
47 When taxing rules do not treat all taxpayers the same, the taxing state is discriminating among taxpayers, a 
possible violation of the state aid prohibition in the EU if the taxpayers are residents or nationals of different states. 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union supra note 20. Likewise, residents of different states in the U.S. 
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (residence-based discrimination impermissible).  
48 Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 47 (2010) (analyzes the development of tax 
planning and sheltering comparatively as tax avoidance became an independent culture, general anti-avoidance 
rules, and proposes a broad-based approach to combating tax avoidance). 
49 Rhetorical insofar as the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and other international bodies cannot function 
successfully without relinquishment of national sovereignty. Compare discussion infra in part V. 
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most nations. The recent pandemic50 illustrates the difficulty of attaining international consensus 
on any matter as little consensus exists even on a common authority to combat a health threat to 
the entire world population. The pandemic did not elicit an international call to deputize an 
existing World Health Organization to design a method to contain the spread of the virus. Rather, 
each nation and often each governmental sub-unit took its own politically determined approach 
with considerable but limited harmonization of methods. On the tax side, the EU, despite being a 
remarkable, voluntary union of sovereign and historically often warring nations, has failed to 
harmonize taxes except in setting a minimum value-added tax rate with incompletely harmonized 
operating rules.51 The EU itself as a governmental unit lacks the power to tax, although a nascent 
movement to grant limited taxing authority to a central EU government along with a US-type 
federalist model of overlapping state and central taxing authority has begun to gather support 
among leading tax academics.52 The task of broad-based harmonization is formidable. 
Like an earlier paper recommending the creation of an international taxing agency to apportion a 
global income base,53 this paper argues that national sovereignty and national self-interest remain 
impediments to fair taxation and must yield to the international need for predictable taxation at a 
level fair to all. The paper recommends modified international tax rules administered by a single 
international agency that collects and distributes income tax revenue among sovereign states 
based on the contextualized revenue needs of each state under international fairness-based 
principles.54 This paper inquires whether the developed economies might deploy fairer tax 
revenue distribution to persuade less developed economies to abandon tax competition and 
suggests possible coercive devices to nudge voluntary abandonment of tax competition.55
PART II. REGIONALISM AND TAXING JURISDICTIONS. 
With an estimated population of just under one million,56 St. Louis County, Missouri, has eighty-
nine independent municipalities with taxing authority, and the county itself also may tax. Taxing 
50 Supra note 42. 
51 Council Directive 2006/112, of Nov. 28, 2006, The Common System of Value Added Tax 2006 O.J. (L 347) 1 
(EC). Consolidated text available at http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/112/2020-01-01 (last visited July 10, 2020). 
There also has been some harmonization on a few customs matters.  
52 Op-Ed: European Solidarity Requires EU Taxes, EU LAW LIVE (April 21, 2020), https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-
european-solidarity-requires-eu-taxes/. Frans Vanistendael, Apple: Why the EU Needs a Common Corporate Income 
Tax, Tax Notes International (July 27, 2020) 451 (addressing the Apple state aid decision of the GCEU, supra note 
45, and arguing that apportionment of corporate income within the EU is essential). 
53 Ordower, Utopian Visions, supra note 38.
54 Brassey & Ordower, supra note 43. 
55 Alongside this paper’s proposal stands another somewhat more limited impingement on national sovereignty in 
the form of a recent proposal for a uniform global excess profits tax to complement national taxation of MNEs. 
Tarcisio Diniz Magalhaes & Allison Christians, Rethinking Tax for the Digital Economy After COVID-19 (June 26, 
2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3635907 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3635907
56 UNITED STATES CENSUS, St. Louis County, Missouri, (July 1, 2019) 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/stlouiscountymissouri. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648330
Ordower, Uniform International Tax Collection for Global Development Page 12 
authority is derivative of the state of Missouri’s taxing power57 guaranteed by the US 
constitution.58 The St. Louis County Collector of Revenue is responsible for billing and 
collecting ad valorem real and personal property taxes for over two hundred taxing districts in St. 
Louis County.59 The number of taxing districts is more than twice the number of municipalities 
because the school, fire protection, sewer, and municipal taxing districts are not co-extensive 
with municipalities but overlap in somewhat mysterious and often historically determined ways, 
such that multiple school-taxing districts, for example, may overlap the borders of a single 
municipality. Some districts are funded better than others because real estate is more valuable in 
some parts of the county and yields greater sums of real property tax revenue60 than in other 
parts, and some municipalities have more retail space generating more sales tax revenue than do 
others. The state administers sales tax collection and distribution. 
An owner of real property in St. Louis County examining their real estate tax bill finds a 
confusing array of taxing districts imposing a portion of the total tax consolidated into a single 
invoice. That array often differs from one property to another as district borders for differing 
types of taxing districts do not coincide. Rates of tax also differ among similar types of districts.  
The tax base, however, is uniform. Each property has a value attributed to it, and each taxing 
district within which that property lies applies its tax rate to that uniform value in determining 
the tax to impose. There is occasionally some ambiguity when a multiple-use property is 
involved in determining what portion of the property ought to be assessed at the commercial 
rather than the residential percentage, and the appraised value of any property may be contested 
and suffer from inaccuracies and errors in determining value except in limited instances where a 
sale has occurred simultaneously with the fixing of value between parties dealing at arms’ length 
that established the fair market value61 of the property with reasonable certainty. The rules are 
uniform for assessing, collecting, and distributing tax among taxing jurisdictions. The County 
administers the tax, collects the tax payment, and is responsible for sanctions for non-payment 
including seizure and sale of the property to collect unpaid taxes. Taxing districts neither 
57 MO. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
58 U.S. Const. amend. X. 
59 St. Louis County, Mo., Collector of Revenue,  
https://www.stlouisco.com/YourGovernment/CountyDepartments/Revenue/CollectorOfRevenue (last visited July 
10, 2020).  
60 Real property taxes generally are a percentage of the value of the property taxed under rules that base the tax on 
an assessed value lower than the fair value of the property.  For example, the assessment formula in Missouri for 
residential property uses 19% of the appraised value of the property as the base for real property tax.  Commercial 
property would use 32% and farm property 12%. Mo. State Tax Commission, Property Reassessment and Taxation 
Pamphlet 4 (2017), https://stc.mo.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/01/Property-Reassessment-Pamphlet-1-18-
16.pdf. (last visited July 10, 2020).  
61 Merriam-Webster Dictionary online defines “fair market value” as “a price at which buyers and sellers with a 
reasonable knowledge of pertinent facts and not acting under any compulsion are willing to do business” available at 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fair%20market%20value (last visited July 10, 2020). Likewise, 26 
C.F.R. § 20.2031-1(b) (fair market value for estate tax purposes). 
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administer the tax, determine the value of the taxed property nor control sanctions for non-
payment.  
Uniformity in administration and collection is not unusual worldwide. The US is exceptional in 
the range of governmental units that have their own administrative infrastructures devoted to tax 
collection.62 Most countries administer and collect income, value-added taxes, and often property 
taxes, centrally.63 Rates of tax and property values may vary regionally, but the central authority 
distributes the tax collected among the regional governmental units providing services and often 
has responsibility for the enforcement of taxes, even if local governments determine the 
expenditure of the tax collected. 
While the taxing district may set the rate applicable to the taxed property in St. Louis County, 
state constitutional tax limitations require a favorable public vote before a taxing district may 
increase a tax rate,64 and initiatives to increase a tax might succeed in one district but fail in 
another partially overlapping district. The multiplicity of rates and county-determined property 
values means that the governmental services in one location may differ significantly from the 
services in another geographically proximate area within the County. Similarly, with respect to 
the state-administered sales tax, purchases of identical items at identical prices in two stores near 
one another often incur different sales tax amounts because the sales tax rates in proximate 
jurisdictions may differ. Rates of tax are not harmonized, but the state constitution limits the 
rates municipalities and other taxing districts may impose.65 The legislature may impose other 
limitations on permissible rates separate from the constitutional limitations.66
The result of multiple taxing jurisdictions in a relatively small geographic area67 is visible in the 
levels of school funding that impact the educational services for children in St. Louis County 
62 Each state of the US has its own taxing agency responsible for state income and consumption taxes and 
municipalities and other taxing districts with their own agencies are not unusual.  For example, the city of St. Louis 
is not part of St. Louis County and has its own collector of revenue responsible for the city earnings tax as well as ad 
valorem property taxes.  Gregory F.X. Daly, Collector of Revenue, City of St. Louis,  https://www.stlouis-
mo.gov/collector/ (last visited July 10, 2020).
63 The EU member states collect most or all taxes centrally even where sub-jurisdictions impose differing rates in 
addition to the national rate. HM Revenue and Customs, About us, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-revenue-customs/about (last visited June 26, 2020) (UK’s central 
tax, payments and customs authority); Agencia Tributaria, The Tax Agency, Institutional Information, 
https://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT.internet/en_gb/Inicio/La_Agencia_Tributaria/Informacion_institucional/Inf
ormacion_institucional.shtml (last visited June 26, 2020) (Spain’s Tax Agency is responsible for the collection of 
Personal Income Tax, Corporation Income Tax, Value Added Tac, etc.); The Revenue Commissioners, Irish Tax 
and Customs, https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/information-about-revenue/role-of-revenue/core-business.aspx
(last visited June 26, 2020). 
64 MO. CONST. art. X, § 22. Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Tax Limits and the Future of Local Democracy, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 1884 (2020) (cataloguing and analyzing state tax limitations). 
65 MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 8, 11 (limiting rates of tax on personal and real property, respectively).
66 MO. CONST. art. X, § 10(c) (power of the legislature to limit tax). 
67 523 square miles, less than one percent of the land area of Missouri, about half the size of Luxembourg. St. Louis 
County has nearly 20 percent of the Missouri state population and more than three percent of the state’s 6000 special 
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receive.68 Some public-school districts become desirable places to live because they offer well-
funded, high-quality public education while others are lacking in quality and even may fail to 
meet state educational standards.69 Educational disparities across St. Louis County are 
significant. In several municipalities, children living on opposite sides of a street go to schools in 
different school districts and may have quite different educational experiences from one another 
because one school district has greater resources from tax revenue than the other. The school 
district disparities are somewhat self-perpetuating in that the perceived school district quality 
affects property values, causing prices of single-family residences in better school districts to be 
greater than in lower quality districts. Since real estate taxes are based on property value, higher 
value yields more revenue, sometimes even if the tax rate is lower than in the lower quality 
school district.  
Where resource disparities exist among school districts, disparities in educational quality tend to 
follow, often along racial lines.70 In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,71 the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that segregated education could provide equal education and prohibited 
purportedly “separate but equal” schools.72 Remedies to level opportunities for children have 
proved elusive. In some states, federal courts have intervened to address some educational 
disparities by ordering busing of students across districts to remedy imbalances in the racial 
composition of student bodies and afford lower-income people – often people of color – better 
educational opportunities in districts that historically had little or no racial diversity.73 To settle a 
lawsuit, St. Louis County school districts beginning in 1982 initiated a voluntary program busing 
black students from overwhelmingly black St. Louis City schools to predominately white schools 
taxing districts.  MO DEP’T OF REV., Sales Tax Jurisdiction Maps, 
https://mogov.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=22cc45ec926e4f94a1f41027b1bedb0e (last 
visited July 10, 2020).  
68 Quality of education of course is not solely a function of funding but better funding generally contributes to a 
better educational product.
69 In 2019, the County school districts of Brentwood and Jennings represent the extremes. Measured by dollars per 
average daily attendance, Brentwood with $18,801 had nearly twice the funding of the Jennings district with 
$10,371. MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., Building Level Per Pupil Expenditures 2019 Report,  
https://stateofmissouri.app.box.com/s/1nvymfovyruscbmcte1b8dn838mpndlh/file/573737767611(last visited June 
17, 2020). Brentwood is a mid-county district with a predominantly white enrollment. Jennings is a north county 
district with a predominantly black enrollment. Public School Review, Brentwood School District, 
https://www.publicschoolreview.com/missouri/brentwood-school-district/2905880-school-district (63% white 
enrollment as of 2020) (last visited June 26, 2020); Great Schools, Jennings School District, (98% Black enrollment) 
(last visited June 26, 2020).  
70 Id.
71 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
72 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing the prevailing doctrine that racially “separate but equal” 
public facilities were consistent with the equal protection clause of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.) 
73 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (establishing authority of courts to order 
busing to remediate educational segregation).
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in St. Louis County.74 Revenue sharing among districts or consolidation of districts so that all 
pupils, even in a small county like St. Louis, are covered by identical amounts of tax revenue per 
student has not gained sufficient political support, even though uniform tax rules and centralized 
revenue collection would facilitate level revenue distribution. The state of Missouri supplements 
school funding based on funding need but it has not sought to level funding among districts.75
School district boundaries are not an immutable characteristic of each pupil. People may move 
from one school district to another. While economic barriers to relocation may exist and, 
accordingly, relocation may be difficult, better-paying employment could open the door to 
relocation. The better-funded school district may not prevent the family from the less funded 
district from moving across the street to the better-funded district, 76 a right that is not available 
across national borders.77 If, however, too many lower-income individuals move to the more 
affluent school district, the existing residents may choose to limit tax revenue and reject any tax 
increase, diminishing the quality of the public schools. Those longer-term, affluent residents who 
do not relocate may establish private schools for their children that exclude the new residents 
through high costs that often serve as a proxy for prohibited racial discrimination in public 
education.78
No active discussion is underway in St. Louis County to level tax revenue distribution 
countywide to eliminate the disparities in school quality and other governmental services.  
Instead of generous cooperation among taxing districts, there is tax-based competition among 
governmental units. In St. Louis County, municipal governments seek to annex unincorporated 
areas of the county along major thoroughfares where commercial development and 
concomitantly sales tax revenue is projected to grow.79 Negotiation between private developers 
and governmental units for investment in new or renovated facilities that might bring 
employment and future tax revenue occurs on the level of temporary, sometimes long-term, tax 
concessions. Tax concessions, however, undermine the ability of state and local governmental 
units to generate revenue to support necessary government services when state constitutional tax 
limitations already make necessary tax increases troublesome. Concessions to new and existing 
business interests require additional taxes on non-affluent residents or a diminution of services.  
74 Ryan Delaney, St. Louis school desegregation program begins its long wind down, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC RADIO (Nov 
1, 2018) https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/st-louis-school-desegregation-program-begins-its-long-wind-
down#stream/0.  
75 Supra note 69. 
76 Constitutional right to travel and reside without restriction in the U.S. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 
(1868) (prohibiting restrictions on travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31, 638 (1969) (welfare 
benefits may not be conditioned on duration of residency); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338–42 (1972) 
(durational residency requirements for voting). 
77 Despite their proximity, relocation from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico to El Paso, Texas requires a US visa to enter and 
reside unless one is a US citizen or permanent resident. Brassey & Ordower, supra note 43. 
78 Brown v. Bd of Education, supra note 71. 
79 Boundary Commission of St. Louis County reviews proposal for annexation and consolidation, 
https://www.boundarycommission.com/ (last visited July 10, 2020). 
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Governmental units have utilized extra-taxing power, revenue-raising to supplement limited tax 
revenue. User fees have substituted for government services historically funded with general 
revenue.80 In St Louis County, several municipal governments have resorted to predatory, 
revenue-based policing by aggressively enforcing municipal ordinances, especially traffic rules, 
to collect fines and court fees from non-affluent violators to supplement tax revenue.81
While tax concession competition has played an investment role in the US for many years,82 it 
has become particularly robust during recent decades. MNEs actively solicit bids from 
governments when they are evaluating where to locate a new or expanded facility.83
Governmental units offer tax concessions as all or a portion of their proposal to entice the 
business decision-makers to invest in the geographic area and bring jobs and collateral 
businesses to the governmental unit. Tax concession competition sometimes even becomes 
destructive as the commercial development consumes governmental resources without 
contributing adequately to tax revenue. Occasionally, the business attracted with special tax 
concessions relocates again when the period of the tax concession expires and leaves the 
governmental unit with facilities it cannot adequately utilize.84 Business demand for tax-based 
government contributions has become an important -- possibly indispensable -- feature of major 
developments throughout the US. When governmental offers are insufficient, the businesses go 
elsewhere.85 More egalitarian tax revenue distribution across borders might render tax 
concession competition obsolescent as unnecessary.  
The US has substantial competition across taxing districts and a confusing profusion of taxing 
units and tax bases, so that items included in one tax base frequently become subject to tax under 
another base as well. Income may be subject to a federal income tax, a wage income tax (social 
security), a state income tax, and a local (wage-based) income tax, and the income remaining 
after the income taxes may become subject again to a consumption tax when the taxpayer 
deploys it for purchases and an annual property tax following purchase. Each tax competes for its 
80 Kleiman, supra 64; Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., User Fees Versus Taxes, TAX ANALYSTS (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/features.nsf/Articles/27F622B404B089F68525793E00536946?OpenDocument (last 
visited July 10, 2020).  
81 Henry Ordower, J.S. Sandoval, & Kenneth Warren, Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax 
Distribution and Constitutional Limitations, 61 HOWARD L.J. 113 (2017) (arguing that fines for some violations are 
taxes imposed in violation of the state constitution rather than punishments for violations of ordinances). 
82 Henry Ordower, Les Impôts Relatifs aux Investissements Étrangers aux États-Unis d'Amérique (observations 
générales), 1996-2 Revue Internationale de Droit Economique 185-201 (1996) (includes discussion of negotiated 
state or local tax concessions). 
83 Nick Wingfield, Amazon Chooses 20 Finalists for Second Headquarters, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/technology/amazon-finalists-headquarters.html.  
84 Robin Respaut, With NFL Rams gone, St. Louis still stuck with stadium debt, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2016),  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sports-nfl-stadiums-insight/with-nfl-rams-gone-st-louis-still-stuck-with-stadium-
debt-idUSKCN0VC0EP.  
85 Scott Cohn, Amazon reveals the truth on why it nixed New York and chose Virginia for its HQ2, CNBC (Jul 10 
2019) https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/amazon-reveals-the-truth-on-why-it-nixed-ny-and-chose-virginia-for-
hq2.html (Amazon withdrew from New York City when city council members balked at size of the tax concessions). 
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share of overall tax revenue. Part of the competition among jurisdictions may be the absence of 
one of the taxes. Florida and Texas, for example, impose no individual state income tax.86
Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon impose no sales tax. Tax competition 
allows private parties to allocate a portion of what should be tax revenue to themselves as 
general provisions, like the charitable contribution deduction,87 enable taxpayers to allocate a 
portion of a taxing unit’s revenue to other private interests rather than leaving the revenue 
distribution to the government officials charged with distributing the public purse. In the case of 
charitable contributions, the private interests are charities of the donor’s choice88 rather than 
governmentally selected functions. 
Tax concessions often mean that those best able to pay taxes are not required to pay. Tax 
concessions do not necessarily reduce tax revenues for the taxing unit granting the concessions.  
If the new business activity did not exist in the taxing unit previously, it was not generating tax 
revenue. Nevertheless, business development frequently increases demand for governmental 
services and concomitantly the need for tax revenue to pay for the services. Funding the services 
may require property owners, other than those receiving concessions, to pay increased property 
taxes. Alternatively, and probably more often, funding requirements result in increased 
consumption taxes to carry the increased tax burden at the expense of those less able to pay. In 
locales subject to statutory or constitutional tax limitations requiring voter approval for tax 
increases, voters approve rate increases for sales taxes, for example, more readily than increased 
property taxes,89 even though those consumption taxes tend to be regressive relative to income or 
wealth. Moreover, increased consumption tax revenue may not flow from the increased business 
activity, as the dedication of consumption tax revenue from the new business activity to the 
business’ facilities or debt servicing may be among the concessions.90 Facilities for product 
distribution produce relatively little incremental consumption tax revenue locally as the 
86 Julie Roin (Chicago), Changing Places, Changing Taxes: Exploiting Tax Discontinuities, Symposium on Legal 
Discontinuities (Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research, Tel Aviv University), 22 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN 
LAW ___ (2020).  
87 I.R.C. § 170. 
88 Henry Ordower, Charitable Contributions of Services: Charitable Gift Planning for Non-Itemizers, 67 THE TAX 
LAW. 517 (2014). 
89 Legislative Analysts Office, A Look at Voter-Approval Requirements for Local Taxes, (Mar. 20, 2014) 
https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/finance/local-taxes/voter-approval-032014.pdf (greater approval rate for taxes that 
don’t require a special majority); BallotPedia, Taxes on The Ballot (Missouri), 
https://ballotpedia.org/Taxes_on_the_ballot (last visited July 3, 2020) (listing various tax provision ballots, 
including general and property tax increases, and whether they were approved or defeated).  
90 This is a common concession for servicing indebtedness on professional entertainment facilities, including 
stadiums. The Dallas Morning News, Arlington’s Records Sales-Tax Revenue Will Pay Off Cowboys Stadium Debt 
Years Early, (Nov. 21, 2012), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2012/11/22/arlington-s-record-sales-tax-revenue-
will-pay-off-cowboys-stadium-debt-years-early/ (record sales tax revenue rise allows city leaders to pay off the 
stadium debt early); Alicia Robinson, Stadium Maintenance, Debt Eat into Anaheim’s Revenue From Hosting 
Angels Baseball, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Sep. 25, 2019), 
https://www.ocregister.com/2019/09/25/stadium-maintenance-debt-eat-into-anaheims-revenue-from-hosting-angels-
baseball/.  
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consumption taxes are collected and paid to the taxing authority where the purchaser receives 
and uses the product, if at all.91 Jurisdictions that collect income or payroll taxes may derive 
additional revenue from the workers at the new facility, but in many instances those workers are 
not new but have changed employment. Where the workers are new taxpayers in the jurisdiction, 
they generally are moderate to low income workers. Taxes applicable to them are flat or 
regressive92 rather than progressive,93 and do not impact the high income or wealth business 
owners. 
The growing disparity in wealth between affluent and non-affluent residents of the U.S.94 has 
been attributed in part to taxation.95 Proposals to introduce or expand progressivity in taxation to 
impose a greater tax burden on affluent taxpayers or to impose a tax on wealth have found 
proponents among candidates for public office who would deploy the revenue to improve 
services and living conditions for the less affluent members of the society, that is redistributing 
that increased burden to level wealth disparity.96 Those candidates have not garnered adequate 
political support for their positions to enact the changes. Recent analysis by a group of 
economists addressing recovery from the economic impact of the 2020 pandemic instills new 
91 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (expanding the authority of states to require vendors with 
no physical presence in the state to collect and pay over the sales or use tax on items sold to state residents). Sales 
taxes are add-on taxes imposed when personal property is purchased for consumption rather than resale. The vendor 
generally collects the tax and pays it over to the state in which the sale occurs. If the vendor sells to a purchaser in 
another state, the purchaser becomes liable to the other state for complementary use tax. Collection of use tax is 
difficult unless the vendor collects and pays over the tax. Until the Wayfair decision, states could not require a 
vendor to collect use tax on sales into the state unless the vendor had a direct or indirect presence there. The Wayfair 
decision removed the physical presence requirement for vendors with substantial sales into a state so that a state may 
require out of state vendors to collect their use tax and pay it over less a fee for their collection services. The state of 
Missouri has not yet enacted legislation implementing the Wayfair decision for sales into Missouri. Hannah Meehan, 
Comment, Sales Tax for Remote Sellers: Missouri’s Response in A Post-Wayfair World, 65 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2021, draft manuscript of July 7, 2020 on file with the author). 
92 Compare the regressive social security tax in the US that is imposed at a flat rate on wages (not income from 
investment or business ownership) up to a ceiling amount of $137,700 in 2020 and then zero for wages in excess of 
that ceiling. IRS, Social Security and Medicare Withholding Taxes, 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc751#:~:text=Social%20Security%20and%20Medicare%20Withholding%20Rates,e
mployee%2C%20or%202.9%25%20total. (last visited July 10, 2020).  
93 St. Louis City Earnings Tax is imposed on income from services only at a flat rate of 1 percent. St. Louis, Gregory 
F.X. Daly, Collector of Revenue, Earnings Tax, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/collector/earnings-tax-home.cfm (last 
visited July 10, 2020). 
94 Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, University of California, 
(updated March 2, 2019), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2017.pdf (last visited July 10, 2020); 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, The Distribution of Household Income, 2016, (July 9, 
2019), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55413. 
95 Saez, supra note 94, and Henry Ordower, Taxation and Inequality, in KIMBERLEY L. KINSLEY & ROBERT S.
RYCROFT, INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE RICH POOR DIVIDE (Santa Barbara, 
forthcoming 2020). 
96 Neil Irwin, Elizabeth Warren Wants a Wealth Tax. How Would That Even Work?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 
18, 2019)  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/upshot/warren-wealth-tax.html; Huaqun Li and Karl Smith, 
Analysis of Sen. Warren and Sen. Sanders’ Wealth Tax Plans, TAX FOUNDATION (January 27, 2020), 
https://taxfoundation.org/wealth-tax/.
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force into the wealth tax and withdrawal or freezing of tax benefits for successful businesses.97
Even if enacted, however, no one is proposing distribution of increased tax revenue beyond the 
borders of the relevant taxing unit -- whether that unit is a specialized, municipal, state, or 
national unit. A school taxing district in St. Louis County is not sharing revenue with another 
school taxing district, nor a state like Missouri sharing revenue with a neighboring state like 
Arkansas, nor the US sharing revenue with Mexico. While residents may move freely between 
St. Louis County school districts or across state lines, if the better-funded school district is in El 
Paso, Texas, U.S.A. and the lesser funded district in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, moving to the 
better-funded district is problematic even if the distance from one to the other is short.98
The concept of sovereignty supports respecting a taxing unit’s choice to spend the tax revenue it 
manages to collect, even where the tax base is produced by activities in other places. A product 
manufactured in Illinois but sold to Missouri consumers is subject to Missouri consumption tax, 
as a product manufactured in Mexico but transported to and then sold to US consumers is subject 
to consumption taxes in the US, not Mexico. Illinois or Mexico in the examples derives no 
benefit from the consumption tax on sale. Illinois and Mexico might encourage their local 
vendors to assist purchasers in Missouri or the US, respectively, to avoid Missouri or other US 
consumption taxes by shipping items directly to consumers in the other jurisdiction free from the 
consumption tax.99 Any benefit Illinois or Mexico derives from increased business activity 
locally, even if minimal, is nevertheless more than it would have received from the consumption 
tax imposed by a neighboring jurisdiction. Sovereignty is a political shield that fails to take 
unequal distribution of wealth and resources into account. 
Despite central collection and administration in St. Louis County or, with respect to consumption 
taxes, the state of Missouri, sharing revenue across taxing unit borders remains bewilderingly 
difficult no matter how geographically close or closely connected the communities may be, how 
similar the residents are to one another, and how unequal the revenue distribution may be.  
Leveling revenue distribution to provide comparable services and opportunities throughout St. 
Louis County seems a desirable fairness objective. Even within St. Louis County’s narrow 
governmental overlay of central collection and administration under uniform taxing rules and 
with a uniform tax base, taking this next step toward fairer distribution of tax revenue remains 
elusive.  
For businesses within St. Louis County where taxing rules, structures and measurement of the 
tax object are uniform, differentials in local property tax rates remain a factor in evaluating 
where to locate or expand a business facility. Active tax competition and disparities in tax 
97 Amanda Athanasiou, Economists Launch Global Tax Plan for Pandemic Recovery, TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L
(June 16, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/corporate-taxation/economists-launch-
global-tax-plan-pandemic-recovery/2020/06/16/2cmhr.
98 Compare discussion, supra, note 76 - 77 and accompanying text.  
99 Subject to possible use tax collection obligations, see Wayfair, supra, note 91. 
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revenue among taxing jurisdictions in St. Louis County help to make some business locations 
more desirable than others. Taxing jurisdictions within St. Louis County have not unified to 
distribute revenue to promote development for the entire region, but that step would be 
administratively feasible because the infrastructure for it is already in place. Only rates of tax and 
the distribution formula would require revision to make fairer shares of resources available to all 
districts.  
If distribution of tax revenue to achieve greater uniformity in governmental services is a 
desirable goal, as this article argues it is, uniform tax rules, uniform tax rates, and a distribution 
formula meeting community needs is critical to achieve that goal. Disparities in revenue 
distribution in St. Louis County are easy to level with the fundamental tax base uniformity 
already in place, even though leveling is not occurring or even under discussion. Globally, the 
OECD is promoting increased uniformity, not to level tax resource distribution, but to combat 
tax competition that diminishes tax revenue for developed economies. While frequently couched 
in terms of MNEs and other taxpayers ceasing to engage in tax avoidance and paying their “fair 
share” of tax, a primarily political objective,100 generating increased tax revenue to ameliorate 
relative poverty locally has not been matched with worldwide tax revenue distribution to 
eliminate absolute poverty internationally.101
If assistance and cooperation from less developed economies in combatting tax competition and 
tax avoidance is necessary to advance the developed economies’ efforts, fairer worldwide tax 
revenue distribution is critical, and less developed economies must be given a reason not to use 
their tax systems to compete. Globally, distribution is of first importance but uniformity remains 
a close second in significance because without uniformity, as is present in the St. Louis County 
administered property value tax base, it is difficult to compare tax levies to ascertain whether one 
country is collecting an appropriate tax on its share of the worldwide tax base. The tax base in 
international projects is income, but not all tax systems measure income in an identical manner. 
The next section considers whether international projects facilitate any movement toward 
uniform rules to facilitate fairer tax revenue distribution. No international project has selected tax 
revenue, as opposed to tax base, distribution as its objective except as an incidental effect of tax 
base allocation.  
PART III. INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND REALLOCATING THE TAX BASE. 
A. BEPS and Other Projects.  
In response to aggressive tax planning and “harmful” tax competition,102 various proposals have 
been crafted to prevent base erosion and profit shifting — a practice that has come to a peak in 
100 Brassey & Ordower, supra note 43.  
101 Id. and Part IV, infra. 
102 Speculative costs of revenue loss show that profit shifting has a more harmful effect on developing countries, 
with the implied long run revenue loss for advanced economies totaling 0.6% of the GDP, and close to 2% of the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648330
Ordower, Uniform International Tax Collection for Global Development Page 21 
light of the digital economy and a surge in intangible, digital assets. As the current leader in 
international tax, the OECD has spearheaded most projects, such as the Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (“BEPS”) action reports and the Global Anti-Base Erosion (“GLoBE”) proposal. In 
parallel with the OECD projects, the EU also has relaunched the CCCTB103 to harmonize the 
taxing rules and standards of Member States and to better incorporate the BEPS actions through 
cohesive legislation. The CCCTB more simply tries to apportion the corporate income tax base 
consistently and predictably among the EU jurisdictions in which the company operates so that 
each may tax its share of an MNE’s income under its own income tax rules but with no part of 
the income subject to tax in more than one jurisdiction or not subject to tax in any jurisdiction.104
While the CCCTB project does not seek complete uniformity in computational rules for tax 
purposes beyond what is necessary to facilitate apportionment, its adoption should result in 
considerable convergence of tax rules to create a consistent base to apportion. 
Requested and endorsed by the G20105 leaders, the OECD aggregated 15 Actions intended to 
combat the abuse of profit shifting as exasperated by the digital economy. The Actions cover the 
unique challenges of the digital economy;106 aim to neutralize hybrid mismatch arrangements;107
strengthen CFC rules;108 reduce base erosion via interest deductions and other financial 
payments;109 recognize and counter harmful tax practices;110 prevent treaty abuse;111 prevent the 
artificial avoidance of permanent establishment;112 ensure transfer pricing outcomes are in line 
with value creation;113 collect and analyze data on BEPS;114 require the disclosure of aggressive 
GDP for developing countries. Ernesto Crivelli, et al, Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries, 20 
IMF Working Paper (May 2015) https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15118.pdf.  
103 Supra note 22. 
104 Edward D. Kleinbard , Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011) (introducing the concept of stateless 
income as income not taxable anywhere).  
105 Michael Crowley, What Is the G20?, NEW YORK TIMES (June 27, 2019), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/world/asia/what-is-the-g20.html (visited July 26, 2020).
106 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
107 OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). Compare, I.R.C. §267A (denying 
deductions or exclusions for related party and hybrid transactions resulting in a mismatch of inclusion and exclusion 
or deduction).
108 OECD, Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Action 3 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
109 OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, Action 4 - 2015 
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
110 OECD, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, 
Action 5 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
111 OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - 2015 Final 
Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
112 OECD, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 - 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
113 OECD, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 - 2015 Final Reports, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2105). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648330
Ordower, Uniform International Tax Collection for Global Development Page 22 
tax planning arrangements;115 re-examine transfer pricing;116 improve dispute resolution 
mechanisms;117 and create a multilateral instrument.118 Only four of the actions, however, were 
agreed upon as part of the minimum standards discussed in the BEPS Inclusive Framework, and 
committed to by the member countries.119
Despite such ambitious and all-encompassing objectives, the action plans have fallen short of 
some critics’ expectations.120 A repeated criticism of the BEPS project is that it does not address 
the underlining fatalities of the existing international tax system, and instead rehashes and 
strengthens existing rules and principles.121 Some commentators state that the foundational tax 
base allocation rules that pre-exist and are enforced by BEPS ensure that higher income countries 
are consistently assigned a greater share of revenue than lower income countries.122 The OECD 
114 OECD, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
115 OECD, Mandatory Disclosure Rules, Action 12 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
116 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 - 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015).
117 OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
118 OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, Action 15 - 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris (2015). 
119 The minimum standards: fighting harmful tax practices (Action 5), preventing tax treaty abuse (Action 6), 
improving transparency with Country-by-Country reporting (Action 13), and enhancing the effectiveness of 
mechanisms for dispute resolution. OECD, Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Progress Report July 2016-June 2017, 
OECD Publishing, Paris (2017). To date, 137 countries are members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS. OECD (December, 2019) https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf.  
120 Adam Rosenzweig, Defining a Country’s Fair Share of Taxes, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 426 (2015); Steven 
Dean, Neither Rules Nor Standards, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 538 (2011); Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the 
Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 145 (1998). 
121 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits Principle and Proposal 
for UN Oversight, 60 HARV. BUS. L. REV.186, 208 (2016); Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for 
Tax Coordination, 21 FLA. TAX. REV. (2017) (the project’s lack of coordinated rules instead results in vague 
standards that everyone could agree on because they mean different things to each country. Further, the OECD 
missed the opportunity to truly examine the underlying causes of the issues and meaningfully discuss the reasons for 
tax competition and the tension between emerging economies and OECD members); Michael P. Devereux and John 
Vella, Are We Heading Towards a Corporate System Fit for the 21st Century?, Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation (Nov. 2014) (it is not a fundamental reform because the OECD does not set out to change the 
framework or even question the desirability or logic of the existing regime). See also Jakib A. Bartoszewski & 
Andew P. Morris, An Archipelago of Contrasts: Blacklists, Caribbean Autonomy and the New Tax Colonialism, IFC 
(June 17, 2020) https://www.ifcreview.com/articles/2020/june/an-archipelago-of-contrasts-blacklists-caribbean-
autonomy-and-the-new-tax-colonialism/ (arguing that the blacklisting of Caribbean tax havens by the EU is a new 
form of colonialism and the EU should instead focus on designing its own efficient tax regime to protect its tax 
revenue). Similarly, Steven A. Dean, FATCA, the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus, and the OECD Blacklist, 99 
TAX NOTES INT'L 83 (July 6, 2020) (discussing the role of the Congressional Black Caucus in the US withdrawal 
from the OECD project on harmful tax competition because of its adverse effect on low wealth, predominantly black 
jurisdictions).
122 Christians & van Apeldoorn, supra note 37.
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has recognized and committed itself to being more inclusive of developing countries,123 although 
some believe that the only way to achieve this is by overhauling the foundational principles of 
the existing system, which inherently favors higher income countries, and which BEPS fails to 
do.124 Others believe that the Actions allow for greater source-country taxation, which could be 
beneficial for developing countries that generally are considered source countries, although this 
may be dependent on multinational consensus on the allocation of taxing rights.125
There is some praise for Action 13, which re-examines transfer pricing documentation, including 
the requirement that MNEs provide relevant governments with the information necessary to 
correct and fair allocation of income among states,126 as well as Action 15 for the multilateral 
instrument.127 Brauner considers the country-by-country reporting recommendation innovative 
and collaborative, as it enhances transparency and allows informed discussion.128 Further, 
Brauner considers the multilateral instrument almost revolutionary given the predominantly 
bilateral tax regimes, and states that success of this action should be interpreted as success of the 
BEPS project, regardless of the other actions.129 And Grinberg provides a quantitative approach 
for practical limitations on application of Pillar I.130
B. GLoBE – Minimum Tax and Base Erosion.  
Following concern and criticism that the BEPS final actions do not go far enough in addressing 
the issues of profit shifting, the OECD responded with the GLoBE proposal. Pillar one of 
GLoBE concerns the allocation of tax rights among jurisdictions, and Pillar Two imposes two 
new taxes: a global minimum tax on corporate profits and a tax on base eroding payments.131
Encompassed within the global minimum tax is the income inclusion rule, implementing a top-
up tax for foreign entities where the income was subject to a tax below the effective minimum 
rate, as well as the switch-over rule, allowing residence jurisdictions to switch from an 
exemption to a credit method when profits attributable to a permanent establishment are subject 
123 OECD, Public Consultation Document Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One 9 
October 2019 – 12 November 2019, Item 15, p. 5, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-
secretariat-proposal-unified-approach-pillar-one.pdf (last visited July 10, 2020). 
124 Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax Coordination, 21 FLA. TAX. REV. 1 (2017).
125 Spencer, David, BEPS and Allocation of Taxing Rights, 29 J. INT’L TAX’N 34 (2018). 
126 Supra note 116, at 23. 
127 Supra note 118. 
128 Brauner, Yarviv, What the BEPS? 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014). But supra note 121, Devereux & Vella (noting 
that the information is only to be disclosed to tax authorities and not the public, therefore reducing its transparency). 
129 Id. See also Rasmus Corlin Christensen & Martin Hearson, The New Politics of Global Tax Governance: Taking 
Stock a Decade after the Financial Crisis, 26 REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 1068, 1077 (2019) (noting that the 
multilateral instrument is the result of deeper and broader sovereignty-constraining effects than ever before). 
130 Itai Grinberg, Design of Scope Limitations for OECD Pillar 1 Work, 167 TAX NOTES FED. 1843 (June 15, 2020).  
131 OECD, Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the 
Digitalisation of the Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, Paris (2019).
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to an effective rate below the minimum.132 Functionally, the minimum tax would resemble the 
US worldwide taxation system under which US persons are taxable on their worldwide income 
in the US133 but reduced through a tax credit by the tax properly payable to the source 
jurisdiction.134 The GLoBE tax on base eroding payments includes the undertaxed payments rule, 
which denies deductions or imposes source-based taxation for payments to related parties that 
are not subject to the specified minimum tax rate, and the subject to tax rule, which only grants 
certain treaty benefits if the item of income was subject to the specified minimum tax rate.135
The GLoBE project136 suggests a means to remove tax from the international mix of business 
development incentives. Although GLoBE focuses on the digital economy, its principles apply to 
a much broader range of problems. GLoBE’s two fundamental principles resemble approaches 
the US and other jurisdictions already have taken with respect to their own resident MNEs. One 
principle includes the income of foreign branches and controlled entities in the income of the 
parent or principal entity based in the higher tax jurisdiction if the branch or controlled entity is 
resident in a low tax jurisdiction.137 Unlike most countries that have territorial income tax 
systems under which branch income is only taxable where earned, the US already includes the 
income of foreign branches under the rubric of worldwide taxation of its citizens, residents and 
domestic entities.138 Unless the US taxpayers interpose a foreign corporation,139 they are taxable 
on foreign source income immediately and capture no benefit from operating or investing 
directly in a low tax jurisdiction.140
The GLoBE proposal as applied to controlled entities resembles existing CFC141 regimes 
common to the US and other jurisdictions.142 In the US, subpart F income143 of a CFC is taxable 
132 OECD, Public Consultation Document Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GLoBE”) (Pillar Two): Tax 
Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, 6, OECD Publishing, Paris (2019).
133 Treas. reg. § 1.1-1(b), supra note 40. 
134 I.R.C. § 901, supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
135 GLoBE Proposal, supra, note 132.
136 Id.
137 Id.; Devereux, et al., supra note 20, at 1-2; Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J.
INT'L L. ___ (2020).
138 Treas. reg. § 1.1-1(b) supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
139 The US may not tax the income of a foreign corporation from non-US sources and not effectively connected with 
the conduct of a US trade or business. I.R.C. §§ 11(d), 882 (tax on foreign corporations). 
140 New but limited territoriality in US tax law under I.R.C. § 245A, added by the TCJA , now provides a 100 
percent dividends received deduction for distributions from foreign corporations to US corporate shareholders 
owning at least 10 percent of the foreign corporation enables US corporations to operate outside the US through 
non-US subsidiaries and, subject to CFC and base erosion minimum tax limitations, avoid the US income tax. 
141 A CFC is a foreign corporation in which United States shareholders (“US shareholders”) own more than 50 
percent of the voting shares and share value. I.R.C. § 957(a). I.R.C. § 951(b) defines US shareholder as a US person 
owning, directly or indirectly, 10 percent or more of the voting shares or the share value of the foreign corporation. 
142 Supra note 137. 
143 I.R.C. § 952. 
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to its US shareholders.144 Like the GLoBE minimum tax treatment of rates at least equal to the 
minimum tax rate, if the foreign base company income145 portion of the subpart F income is 
taxed in the CFC residence country at a rate greater than 90 percent of the US corporate tax 
rate,146 that portion of the subpart F income is not subject to CFC inclusion in the US 
shareholders’ incomes.147 Foreign base company income includes income from sales and 
services attributable to the CFC if there is little or no business reason, other than tax, for sourcing 
the income in that corporation.148 US shareholders of CFCs also must include annually their pro 
rata shares of the CFCs global low-taxed income from intangible property, a connection which 
would include the digital economy on which GLoBE focuses.149
The second pillar of the GLoBE proposals, the “base erosion” proposal, disallows deductions 
and treaty benefits for base erosion payments. A base erosion payment but for the GLoBE 
proposal rule would yield a deduction or enjoy a treaty benefit without the payment becoming 
subject to tax in the recipient’s jurisdiction at or above a designated minimum rate. Tax rate 
arbitrage with related party payments is commonplace where no anti-avoidance rule or minimum 
tax discourages it. Where the parties to the transaction have a community of economic interests 
as related parties do or have some other opportunity to return part of the low tax jurisdiction’s 
profit to other party free from a tax in the higher tax jurisdiction, the parties may share the tax 
savings from the structure without any non-tax economic cost to either party.150 The base erosion 
proposal addresses this longstanding problem of tax rate arbitrage. Examples of rate arbitrage 
and tax law provisions to limit them are ubiquitous. A simple example in the US is the “kiddie 
tax” under which investment income of minor children is taxed at their parents’ marginal rate 
rather than the rate that would apply if the children’s income were permitted to advance through 
customary marginal rate brackets.151 Where the payments are between related parties, transfer 
pricing limitations long have enabled the tax administrator to attribute the income to a different 
144 I.R.C. § 951(a) includes the US shareholder’s prorata share of the CFC’s subpart F income, as defined in I.R.C. § 
952, in the shareholder’s US income subject to tax currently without distribution from the CFC.  
145 I.R.C. § 954. 
146 I.R.C. § 11 (corporate rate is 21 percent and 90 percent of that rate is 18.9 percent).  
147 I.R.C. § 954(b)(4) (income subject to an effective foreign rate of tax greater than 90 percent of the US rate 
(currently 21 percent, so more than 18.9 percent) not included under I.R.C. §952.
148 For example, I.R.C. § 954(d) (defining foreign base company sales income where neither production nor use of 
the property sold is in the CFC’s home country). 
149 I.R.C. § 951A (added by an unnamed tax act commonly referred to as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 
115–97 (Dec. 22, 2017) (“TCJA”)).
150 Compare I.R.C. § 7701(o) requiring economic substance independent of tax benefits for an arrangement to yield 
the tax outcomes that the parties have structured into the transaction. 
151 I.R.C. § 1(g) (taxing children’s investment income at parents’ rate of tax). The partnership substantial economic 
effect requirement for allocations, I.R.C. § 704(b), and the unrelated business income tax provisions for tax exempt 
organizations, I.R.C. § 511, are further examples. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648330
Ordower, Uniform International Tax Collection for Global Development Page 26 
taxpayer than the taxpayer receiving it.152 The US now also has a separate base erosion minimum 
tax for certain related party payments.153
The minimum tax and the denial of the deduction or treaty benefit would compel the low tax 
jurisdiction to enact a rate at least equal to the minimum rate lest it relinquish the potential tax 
revenue without having a benefit to offer to the investor because the high tax jurisdiction will 
capture the difference between the low tax jurisdiction’s actual tax and the minimum tax or all 
the revenue in the case of the base erosion payment.154 While the objectives of the proposal are 
to target profit shifting and reduce tax competition, some critics consider the second objective to 
be much more difficult to achieve, and in fact a severe departure from the policy consensus of 
the BEPS project - that no or low taxation is not a per se cause of concern, but rather practices 
that artificially segregate taxable income are.155 Now it seems that this is in fact the concern, and 
there is speculation that this could impact countries’ ability to attract real investment and 
activity, as well as prevent countries from taxing profits generated through real activity taking 
place within their borders at any rate they choose, thereby diminishing their sovereignty.156 Other 
commentators appreciate that the minimum tax could significantly reduce the distortions of 
international capital allocation, and therefore reduce the incentive to profit shift, though it does 
not fully equalize the tax burden of domestic and foreign investment.157 Similarly, the view that a 
minimum tax infringes on sovereignty is considered by some as a questionable premise, as 
unfettered sovereignty can only be claimed in purely internal situations, whereas in the 
international context, there are other external interests to consider.158
The GLoBE proposal does acknowledge that there is a capital imbalance across borders 
disfavoring less developed relative to more developed economies. The OECD views this 
proposal as a way to remedy that imbalance. The proposal would allocate a somewhat greater 
share of the base to less developed jurisdictions. The project also considers that the minimum tax 
under the guise of tax fairness will inhibit jurisdictions from engaging in tax-based competition 
for inbound investment by offering tax concessions to international investors. Less developed 
jurisdictions will collect more tax on their larger shares of the tax base than they might have 
collected with robust tax competition because they will impose a tax at a rate no less than the 
minimum tax.   
Like the other OECD projects, the GLoBE project respects most tax sovereignty. It restructures 
the manner in which the income tax base is shared among countries to allocate a bit more to less 
152 I.R.C. § 482 and related regulations.  
153 I.R.C. § 59A, added by TCJA, imposing a minimum tax at 10 percent, increasing to 12.5 percent in 2025. 
154 Devereaux et al., supra note 20, and discussion infra part V. 
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2. 
157 Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, International Effective Minimum Taxation – The GLoBE Proposal, SSRN 
Electronic Journal (Jan. 2019).  
158 Id.
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developed countries and intrudes upon taxing sovereignty with effective economic compulsion to 
enact a minimum rate of tax.159 Except for the minimum rate, the project does not promote broad 
taxing uniformity. Neither does the project recommend uniform rules of taxation across 
jurisdictions. It leaves the administration and collection of tax on the jurisdiction’s share of the 
tax base to each taxing jurisdiction. Accordingly, a jurisdiction interested in offering a tax-based 
subsidy might adjust its tax rules to benefit the subsidized taxpayer while maintaining a nominal 
tax rate equal to the minimum. The complexity of addressing all possible tax subsidization 
permutations will be challenging to police. Each developed economy could impose its own rules 
indirectly on other economies by applying its own taxing rules in determining whether or not an 
MNE was subject to tax at a rate equal to or greater than the minimum tax rate. Results would 
differ depending on the rules in the taxpayer’s home jurisdiction as opposed to another major 
economy’s rules. Where the MNE is operating in multiple jurisdictions and each or many 
jurisdictions apply their own taxing rules to determine whether the MNE is paying the minimum 
tax amount, a cacophony of outcomes might result offering little improvement over what exists 
now.  
Ultimately, it seems that the success of the proposal depends on the near-unanimous adoption of 
the minimum tax and the tax on base eroding payments. Otherwise, the problems could be 
exacerbated, as other countries who refrain from implementing the measures could manipulate 
this to their tax advantage, enticing MNEs to move their parent company to their jurisdiction.160
Similarly, however, there must be harmonization of the tax base and applicable thresholds, as 
countries could simply continue to compete by adjusting rules of inclusion and thresholds.161
Finally, some of the remaining intricacies that need to be determined could significantly impact 
the implementation by countries as variables of the approaches decrease incentives to do so, such 
as whether carve-outs for non-harmful tax benefits will be implemented and whether the 
minimum tax will be implemented following the “blended” approach.162
C. Tax Competition, Avoidance and Evasion.  
While the OECD pushes on with its project to overhaul taxation of MNEs and has 140 countries 
scheduled to participate in meetings on a revised international tax framework,163 the framework 
is unlikely to eliminate international tax competition. Even among the 140 participants, a variety 
of competing concerns may manifest themselves among the participants. The U.S. and China 
159 Compare the VAT directive in the EU, supra note 51. 
160 Supra note 132 at 14.  
161 Id.
162 Noked, Noam, From Tax Competition to Subsidy Competition, U. PA. J. INT'L L. (2020) (forthcoming). 
163 Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Postpones Key Meeting of Global Tax Overhaul Project, TAXNOTES (May 4, 
2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-news/oecd-postpones-key-meeting-global-tax-overhaul-
project/2020/05/04/2ch38. 
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continue to reserve with respect to digital services,164 and 53 U.N. member states165 are not even 
included in the OECD deliberations. Moreover, while the base erosion projects address a variety 
of methods taxpayers use to shift income source to low tax jurisdictions, they do not unify all 
computational rules and tax rates. 
Internationally, tax competition manifests itself through tax structures and concessions. A 
country might compete internationally by choosing to enact low tax rates generally or reduced 
tax rates and taxpayer favorable tax rules only for non-resident investors or specific types of 
businesses. Alternatively, a jurisdiction might negotiate tax concessions to encourage targeted 
development by offering packages of tax benefits to new or expanding business investment on 
either a temporary or permanent basis. In its harmful tax competition project,166 the OECD 
sought to limit these competitive practices in developed economies by encouraging them to 
abandon certain harmful tax practices.  
The OECD also publicly identified tax havens that engaged in harmful tax competition to shame 
or coerce them to cooperate with the major market jurisdictions and share information. 
Information sharing would assist the developed economy countries to identify investors subject 
to their general taxing jurisdiction when those investors secrete assets in low tax jurisdictions to 
avoid home country taxes.167 The harmful tax competition project has encouraged rapid growth 
of agreements on information sharing.168 The US also coerced international cooperation by 
enacting legislation denying favorable US tax status to foreign entities that did not provide 
information on their US direct and indirect investors who were investing outside the US and not 
reporting their income from those investments.169 Perhaps the most interesting action in 
information gathering was when Germany purchased a stolen list of German investors in 
Liechtenstein Stiftungen to discover those investors’ evasion of German tax liability.170
The US approach to tax competition differs somewhat from that of other OECD countries. Since 
the US taxes its citizens, residents, and domestic entities on their income from all sources 
164 Id. William Hoke, U.S. Says OECD Talks on Digital Economy Have Hit an Impasse, TAXNOTES (June 22, 2020) 
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/digital-economy/us-says-oecd-talks-digital-economy-have-hit-
impasse/2020/06/22/2cmvw; Stephanie Soong Johnston, Business Groups Rally Around OECD Global Tax Deal 
Work, TAXNOTES (June 29, 2020) https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/digital-
economy/business-groups-rally-around-oecd-global-tax-deal-work/2020/06/29/2cnr7?highlight=OECD; Stephanie 
Soong Johnston, Global Tax Revamp Talks ’Not on Life Support,’ Saint-Amans Says, TAXNOTES (June 29, 2020), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/politics-taxation/global-tax-revamp-talks-not-life-support-saint-
amans-says/2020/06/29/2cnj3?highlight=BEPS.  
165 The U.N. has 193 member states.  UN, About the UN - Member States, https://www.un.org/en/about-
un/index.html (last visited June 22, 2020). 
166 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition, supra note 16. 
167 Id.
168 OECD, Tax Information Exchange Agreements, supra note 13 (showing increasing numbers of agreements from 
2001 – 2012). 
169 FATCA, supra note 25. 
170 Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 48, at 124. 
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worldwide,171 operating or investing directly in low tax jurisdictions provides US persons no tax 
benefit provided that the US taxpayer reports completely and honestly. Secreting assets and 
failing to report offshore income is tax fraud which may subject the taxpayer to civil and 
criminal penalties.172 The tax on worldwide income in the US similarly eliminates the benefit of 
negotiated tax concessions insofar as the US applies a credit rather than exemption173 to all 
foreign source income and generally cedes primary taxing authority to the source country 
through the foreign tax credit174 but continues to claim the difference between the US tax on the 
income and the tax imposed by the source jurisdiction.175
US taxpayers may avoid a current tax in the US by operating or investing outside the US through 
a tax opaque, non-US entity.176 The US, however, has enacted an array of mechanisms to protect 
its claim to a share of the foreign source income in which US persons have an indirect interest 
through a non-US corporation.177 The CFC provisions even permit the US to reach across 
national borders to tax part of the income of CFCs to their US shareholders without any actual or 
constructive distribution from the CFCs to the US shareholders as a necessary requirement for 
the tax imposition. With respect to secreted investment capital of US persons, the US also has 
171 I.R.C. § 61 (gross income includes all income from whatever source derived); treas. reg. § 1.1-1(b) (worldwide 
income taxed). 
172 I.R.C. § 7201 (willful attempt to evade tax). Recent legislation in the UK imposes penalties on corporations and 
possibly professionals for aiding corporate tax evasion. Nana Ama Sarfo, After Quiet Start, U.K. Tax Evasion 
Facilitation Law Starting to Make Noise, 98 TAX NOTES INT’L 1208 (June 15, 2020) https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-
notes-today-international/tax-avoidance-and-evasion/after-quiet-start-uk-tax-evasion-facilitation-law-starting-make-
noise/2020/06/15/2cm1c.  
173 Compare the exclusion to credit shift under Pillar II of the OECD GLoBE Proposal, supra, note 132 and 
accompanying text. 
174 I.R.C. § 901 (foreign tax credit). 
175 I.R.C. § 904 (tax credit limitation). For example, A invests in country X and earns $100.  Country X imposes a 
$10 tax on A’s income in X.  The US would impose a $30 tax on the $100 income from X but allows A a tax credit 
of $10 (the X tax) and imposes a net tax on the X source income of $20. If the X tax were $40, the US tax credit for 
A would be limited to $30, the amount of the US tax on the income. 
176 Tax opacity is characteristic of corporations under subchapter C of the Code and contrasts with tax transparency 
of partnerships and other entities under subchapter K of the Code.  A tax opaque entity is itself subject to the income 
tax on its income while a tax transparent entity is not but its owners are taxable on their proportional shares of the 
entity’s income, as if the owners received the income from the source and in the manner that the entity received it. 
I.R.C. § 702(b). Non-US business entities that are included in the foreign entities list in treas. reg. §301.7701-2(b)(8) 
are tax opaque and the default classification of other foreign entities in which the entity’s owners have limited 
liability is also tax opaque, but the owners of the latter group may elect tax transparency. Treas. reg. § 301.7701-
3(b)(2) (referred to as the check-the-box regulation).  Both domestic and foreign tax transparent entities may elect to 
be tax opaque. Treas. reg. § 301.7701-3(a). There also are various hybrid entities such as regulated investment 
companies that are tax opaque entities but allowed a deduction for distributions to their shareholders so that they do 
not pay tax at entity level. I.R.C. § 852. 
177 CFCs under I.R.C. § 951; passive foreign investment companies (“PFICs”) indirectly at the time of sale of shares 
or receipt of distributions through an interest charge unless their US investors elect to be taxed currently on their 
shares of the PFIC’s income (I.R.C. § 1293 – qualified electing fund election – or I.R.C. § 1296 – mark to market 
election); tax on inverted entities under I.R.C. § 7874; foreign personal holding companies (“FPHC”) under I.R.C. § 
551 before repeal in 2004 which imputed a distribution for tax purposes from the corporation to its shareholders 
annually. 
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sought to enlist the assistance of non-US financial institutions in its quest to tax the income that 
capital generates.178
D. Tax Base Allocation and Apportionment.  
Underlying any allocation or apportionment of an income tax base is an implicit assumption that 
a base exists to allocate and apportion. While definitions of income for tax purposes exist,179 the 
elements of any income tax base enjoy commonalities with all income tax bases but the details of 
inclusion, exclusion and deduction differ across jurisdictions. For example, most US states that 
impose an income tax use federal adjusted gross income180 as their point of departure for 
determining the base for the tax.181 Nevertheless, state income tax rules are not uniform. Each 
state modifies the amount of adjusted gross income to arrive at the income base upon which it 
imposes its income tax.182
Internationally, the components of income tax bases vary. While the US includes gain from the 
sale or exchange of property in the income tax base,183 with a partial exception for gain from the 
sale of one’s primary residence184 and a full exemption for a decedent’s gain not taxed before 
their death,185 Germany does not tax gain on tangible personal property held more than a year or 
real property held more than ten years.186 Thus, a US citizen who is resident in Germany and 
sells property in Germany might have no inclusion of gain from the sale of property in Germany 
but have the gain included in their US income for tax purposes without there being any 
difference in the taxpayer’s economic income in Germany and the US. Certainly, tax systems 
have tended to copy elements from other tax systems,187 and tax rules have converged 
considerably over the years so that computational differences between jurisdictions may be 
178 FATCA under which non-cooperating foreign financial institutions lose the benefit of withholding reductions on 
US investments. I.R.C. § 1471.  
179 For example, an oft-cited definition for a comprehensive income tax base is the Schanz-Haig-Simons’ definition 
where income is the algebraic sum of consumption plus or minus the change in the taxpayer’s net worth from the 
beginning to the end of the tax measuring period. HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION 
OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 49 (1938). 
180 I.R.C. § 62. 
181 For example, in Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. § 143.121 (2017) (Missouri adjusted gross income is federal adjusted 
gross income with adjustments). 
182 Id. (Missouri modifications to federal adjusted gross income). 
183 I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001. 
184 I.R.C. § 121. 
185 I.R.C. § 1014 (new tax basis for property received from a decedent’s estate).
186 PWC, Worldwide Tax Summaries, Germany, https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/germany/individual/taxes-on-
personal-income
German Income Tax Act (EStG) (Einkommensteuergesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 8. Oktober 
2009 (BGBl. I S. 3366, 3862), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/estg/BJNR010050934.html#BJNR010050934BJNG000208140.  
187 Infanti, Ethics of Tax Cloning, supra note 11. 
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smaller today than in earlier decades.188 Yet, differences endure so that a single common 
definition of taxable income remains elusive and leaves the possibility that even if an OECD 
project succeeds, its success may be incomplete. 
Turning to the EU, in the hope of strengthening the single market, the relaunched CCCTB 
proposal189 aims to build upon the BEPS actions and effectively integrate the reforms by 
harmonizing the approach of member states.190 This would be achieved through the two-step 
plan: first, the Common Corporate Tax Base (“CCTB”) contains extensive measures to 
implement a cohesive, mandatory corporate tax base definition and calculation system 
throughout the EU, and second, the CCCTB proposal builds upon the CCTB with additional 
measures for tax base consolidation and apportionment.191 The relaunch is praised for its focus 
on tax fairness and commitment to combating base erosion, as compared to the 2011 CCCTB 
which was solely pro-market and pro-business.192
Significant issues remain, however. Although harmonization envisions the resolution of tax 
competition due to transparent tax rate competition, there is some speculation that the proposal 
could in fact incentivize “factor-manipulation,” which would allow artificial tax base shifting to 
continue.193 There is also concern that in leaving out tax rate coordination, Member States are 
not sufficiently constrained from engaging in competition through corporate income tax rates to 
attract economic activity,194 and similarly, countries may circumvent the common tax base by 
moving from allowances to tax credits as incentives.195
188 Luis C. Calderon Gomez, Transcending Tax Sovereignty and Tax Standardization: Three Questions, 45 Yale J. 
Int'l L. 191 (2020) (arguing that there is a movement toward standardization internationally). 
189 The original CCCTB proposal was in 2011. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM (2011) 121 final (Oct. 6, 2011), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2011/EN/1-2011-121-EN-F2-1.Pdf. 
190 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A 
Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, COM(2015) 302 final 
(SWD(2015) 121 final), Brussels, 17 June 2015.
191 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB), COM 
(2016); European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), 25 October 2016.   
192 Christian Valenduc, Corporate Income Tax in The EU, The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) and Beyond: Is it The Right Way to Go? ETUI Research Paper – Working Paper (2018). 
193 Maarten F. de Wilde, Tax Competition Within the European Union Revisited – is the Relaunched CCCTB a 
Solution? 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 24 (2014) (de Wilde believes that as drafted, presuming that the factors for formula 
apportionment are the same as in US tax law, they themselves could be manipulated to continue profit shifting –
such as labor factor manipulation through payroll group members; sales factor manipulation through beneficiary 
group members; and sales factor inflation through shareholding-revenues-carousels. He recognizes, however, that 
this is a risk that could be remedied by judicial interpretations, the application of anti-abuse approaches, or 
legislative prevention of factor manipulation.). 
194 Ireland has a 12.5 percent corporate rate and Estonia a 0 percent rate for Estonian companies on their foreign 
source income.  
195 Supra note 192 at 23; see also Boer, Martin, A Few Comments on the CCCTB Directive, (February 28, 2012). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2012276 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2012276.
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The CCCTB project had a less ambitious objective but presumably required uniform income 
computation rules to develop an income apportionment formula. If its proposal were applied to 
MNEs, its application would have undercut the argument that MNEs are at risk of multiple 
impositions of tax on the same income. The CCCTB apportionment formula would provide 
predictable outcomes and assure that each unit of income is taxable only in a single jurisdiction. 
The proposed CCCTB apportionment formula removed the most fluid source factor of income 
apportionment by eliminating intangible property from the formula.196 Only to the extent that the 
MNE had physical property, employees or sales in a low tax jurisdiction would the formula 
apportion any of the MNE’s income to the low tax jurisdiction.197
The CCCTB proposal is consistent with the assertion that representatives of MNEs frequently 
make that a reasonable level of taxation under unambiguous tax rules is acceptable insofar as all 
MNEs are subject to identical, predictable rules so that none gain a competitive advantage 
through the tax system. The GLoBE project similarly aligns well with assertions that there exists 
a concept of fair share or fair taxation. That concept underlies recent discussions of a minimum 
tax. The reasonableness of a specific level of taxation should remain separate from the 
application of any nation’s tax rules and the correct location for the imposition of the tax, that is, 
the question of which nation may collect that correct amount of tax. Against that backdrop is the 
premise of all BEPS’ iterations that MNEs ought to pay more tax than they do currently. While a 
general notion of a universally correct level of taxation may exist and each MNE and possibly 
each individual should be subject to that level, some (or many) MNEs and individuals are not 
paying that correct level. Yet, the BEPS projects are not geographically neutral in their approach 
to collecting the fair amount of tax but conflate the fair tax concept with geographic 
determinations that the MNEs are avoiding taxes imposed by the developed economies.198 That 
approach politicizes the concept of fairness rather than seeking consensus concerning the correct 
level of taxation free from the political issue of which nation gets the revenue.199
The next part addresses the issue of poverty and the role fair taxation should play in ameliorating 
radical income inequality and poverty. 
PART IV. THE RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE POVERTY CONUNDRUM. 
Once OECD participants agree to an anti-profit shifting structure, MNEs in the aggregate will 
pay additional tax. Whether residence, consumption or another metric becomes the measuring 
instrument to prevent profit shifting, income will be allocated so that MNE’s no longer may 
196 CCCTB, supra note 21, at 51, Art. 92 Composition of the asset factor. 
197 Id. at 49, Art. 86 General Principles. Compare, Ordower, Utopian Visions, supra note 38.  
198 Sarah Paez, Groups Urge U.N. Tax Committee to Reconsider OECD Unified Approach, TAX NOTES INT’L (Jun. 
17, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/groups-
urge-un-tax-committee-reconsider-oecd-unified-approach/2020/06/17/2cmnh (criticizing the Inclusive Framework 
for its adverse impact on revenue in developing economies). 
199 Brassey & Ordower, supra note 43.
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concentrate revenue in low tax jurisdictions that are not, or only minimally are, contributing to 
the production of the income. Allocation factors such as labor measured by person hours rather 
than wages,200 international market sale value of resources rather than extraction value or some 
other value-added measurement201 may direct a somewhat greater share of worldwide profit to 
less developed economies. A minimum tax will limit the ability of less developed economies to 
trade their power to collect taxes for investment. Under all structures under discussion 
internationally, the developed economies are likely to enjoy the bulk of the reallocated or 
increased tax bases and gain additional tax revenue.  
History suggests that some developed countries will deploy the additional revenue for the good 
of all residents while others will follow a course of concentrating benefits through reduced tax 
impositions into the hands of the affluent under the premise that the affluent create jobs for the 
less affluent members of society.202 However the incremental revenue is utilized, it is reasonably 
certain that little of it will find its way to international development,203 and the disparity between 
rich and poor nations and their citizenries seems likely to increase. Just as leveling of revenue 
among St. Louis County taxing districts to smooth wealth disparities among districts on even 
such an essential resource as public education rarely if ever captures the center of attention in 
public debate,204 international revenue distribution to level resource allocation internationally 
rarely if ever becomes the center of tax reform debate internationally despite the absence of a 
moral, rather than political, justification for such resource disparities. Many resource and wealth 
disparities are functions of the happenstance of serendipitous geographic location for some 
populations but not others. 
The 2020 pandemic will augment the numbers of homeless individuals in the US as 
unemployment renders large numbers of Americans unable to meet their residential rent or 
mortgage obligations. School closings have left many children without adequate nutrition 
because they no longer receive the daily meals at school on which they relied for basic nutrition. 
The need for food, shelter, clothing and healthcare in the US is great205 but the need is primarily 
a distribution issue. Food resources in the US are adequate to the population. Even the welfare 
states of Europe have residents in need of support for basic needs. Poverty exists in all the OECD 
member states but in all OECD states it is inexcusable. On a global scale, poverty in developed 
economies rarely compares with the absolute poverty that plagues many undeveloped or 
200 Ordower, Utopian Visions, supra note 38, at 387 (labor factor in the income apportionment formula based on 
person hours of work rather than payroll amounts). 
201 Christians & van Apeldoorn, supra note 37. 
202 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”), for example. 
203 Brassey & Ordower, supra note 43 (discussing international development budgets). 
204 Supra part II.  
205 Feeding America, Facts about Poverty and Hunger in America, https://www.feedingamerica.org/hunger-in-
america/facts#:~:text=More%20than%2037%20million%20people,to%20support%20a%20healthy%20life (last 
visited July 10, 2020) (37 million in the US suffer from food insecurity). 
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developing economies.206 In some countries, people, often children, die from starvation.207
Diseases like malaria that disable and kill many in less developed countries could be controlled 
or eradicated given sufficient economic resources and commitment. Although substantially 
absent in the economically developed countries, hunger is ubiquitous in some less developed 
countries, and homelessness, shortages of clothing, limited educational opportunities all are 
prevalent. Poverty in the OECD countries is relative. Relative to many in the developed 
countries’ societies or the OECD states in general, some people have little and suffer by 
comparison with those who are affluent. The poverty is not absolute. Each of the OECD 
countries has adequate resources without receiving additional tax revenue from MNEs to 
eliminate the relative poverty in that OECD country by redeploying existing resources. Many 
less developed countries could not address the poverty they have without substantial assistance 
from the affluent countries, but the affluent countries have offered only nominal aid relative to 
their gross national incomes208 and national budgets. Most devote less than one percent of their 
gross national income to international development to provide relief from poverty.209
Under such circumstances, private, altruistic actors such as Bill and Melinda Gates through their 
foundation210 and business interests wanting natural resources or inexpensive labor drive 
development in nations suffering much absolute poverty.211 A non-affluent country might seize 
the opportunity for private, inbound investment by supplementing the competitive advantage of 
local low-cost labor with an agreement not to tax the investment capital or the earnings from that 
investment. No tax, perhaps accompanied by other investment incentives, may be sufficient to 
give the non-affluent jurisdiction the necessary competitive edge to gain the inbound capital 
investment. Despite their exploitation with low wages, employment even at low wages for 
206 UN, Global Issues, Food, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/food/index.html (last visited July 10, 
2020) (estimating 821 million people suffering from hunger in 2018). 
207 The World Counts estimates that 9 million people die each year from starvation. The World Counts Global 
Challenges, https://www.theworldcounts.com/challenges/people-and-poverty/hunger-and-obesity/how-many-
people-die-from-hunger-each-year (last visited July 10, 2020). In 2015 it was estimated that 10% of the worldwide 
population were living in conditions of extreme poverty. The World Bank, Decline of Global Extreme Poverty 
Continues but has Slowed: World Bank, (Sep. 19, 2018) https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2018/09/19/decline-of-global-extreme-poverty-continues-but-has-slowed-world-bank. 
208 OECD, Data, Gross National Income, https://data.oecd.org/natincome/gross-national-income.htm (last visited 
July 10, 2020) (“Gross national income (GNI) is defined as gross domestic product, plus net receipts from abroad of 
compensation of employees, property income and net taxes less subsidies on production.”).
209 OECD (2019), Official development assistance as a percentage of gross national income (GNI): Net 
disbursement, all donors, in OECD International Development Statistics, Volume 2018 Issue 1, OECD Publishing, 
Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dev-v2018-1-table3-en (visited 6/16/20). 
210 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Foundation Fact Sheet, https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-
Are/General-Information/Foundation-Factsheet (last visited July 10, 2020). 
211 WAR ON WANT, Fashion Victims- The Facts, https://waronwant.org/fashion-victims-facts (last visited July 10, 
2020) (clothing factories in Bangladesh and India); John Vidal, How Developing Countries are Paying a High Price 
for the Global Mineral Boom, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2015/aug/15/developing-countries-high-price-global-mineral-boom. 
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residents alleviates the absolute poverty212 from which those newly employed residents 
previously may have suffered. If child labor best meets the international concern’s labor
requirements, children work to assist their impoverished families. If taxing the MNE might cause 
the MNE to take its investment capital to another non-affluent country offering lower taxes or no 
tax, relinquishing the potential tax revenue seems an easy choice.  
The OECD projects,213 like US worldwide taxation, might deprive the non-affluent country of 
the opportunity to capture the investment with the assistance of tax concessions. Even if the non-
affluent country manages to secure the investment and, under notions of value creation,214 the tax 
base distribution formula which allocates a significant share of the income of the MNE to the 
non-affluent jurisdiction, that jurisdiction might not have the necessary infrastructure to measure 
the MNE’s income, impose and collect the tax. The non-affluent country historically may have 
relied on VATs or targeted taxes, like natural resource extraction taxes, for example, rather than 
more complex tax bases like an income tax. The jurisdictions may have an inadequate 
administrative infrastructure for such a tax. The newly tax-base-enriched jurisdiction, in some 
instances, might relinquish some of its sovereignty and simply rely on or piggyback onto the 
computations that the affluent home country might perform. Even there the additional tax 
collection administration may prove inefficient or open the door to additional corruption which 
may have been a general problem for the non-affluent country.  
The non-affluent country could choose not to collect the minimum tax leaving the revenue on the 
table for the MNE’s home country to take but that would seem foolish. Persuading some non-
affluent countries to collect tax which MNEs’ home countries otherwise would collect may drive 
those countries to create unofficial and perhaps corrupt schemes to aid the MNEs to avoid their 
home country taxes.215 MNEs might accede to such schemes to meet competitors who already 
participate in such tax avoidance or even evasion and were drawn to the schemes by the promise 
of enhanced profitability. The result of imposition of the GLoBE pillars in the end might mimic 
historical iterations of tightened tax regulation being met with sophisticated tax planning that 
remains one step ahead of the tax legislators and administrators and devises strategies of varying 
legality to avoid new tax regulation.216
If the developed OECD economies wish to enrich affluent state coffers by seizing additional tax 
revenue from MNEs, the OECD projects may begin to accomplish that goal. If the OECD 
membership is offended by the success of MNE’s in avoiding the relatively high taxes of the 
developed economies and has identified a “fair tax” amount or relative amount that each MNE 
212 Id. In some instances, the populace of a low wage country may suffer such exploitation from MNEs in low 
wages, long hours and poor working conditions that it may have been better off before the investment with 
subsistence farming or even such occupations as trash picking. 
213 Supra part III. 
214 Christians & van Apeldoorn, supra note 37. 
215 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition, supra note 16; FATCA (addressing financial institution secrecy). 
216 Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 48, at 48. 
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should pay in tax, without regard to which country receives the revenue, the OECD projects may 
begin to accomplish that goal. If, however, distribution of the “fair tax” revenue in aid of 
international development to eliminate absolute poverty and level resources globally is the goal 
of enhanced tax collections, as it should be, fairer allocation of the tax base itself might do little 
toward that end. Instead, uniform tax collection and tax revenue distribution would seem a better 
choice. The next section imagines an international taxing agency applying uniform tax rules to 
collect revenue and eliminate tax rule and rate arbitrage available through multiple taxing 
jurisdictions.  
PART V. AN INTERNATIONAL TAXING AGENCY FOR AN ECONOMICALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD:
ABANDONING MYTHICAL TAX SOVEREIGNTY 
All base erosion projects require some compromise of tax sovereignty, a topic overdue for more 
serious consideration insofar as sovereignty in taxing well may be a false flag in the world of tax 
treaties, tax information exchange agreements and tax blacklists of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions.217 The business world long has accustomed itself to operating across international 
borders and within the framework of multiple sovereign states. Income tax systems of nations 
participating in the OECD Inclusive Framework218 addressing base erosion and profit shifting 
must converge to smooth and eliminate systemic disparities so that base erosion in one state is 
not simply a structural element of another. Lack of uniformity may facilitate new base erosion.219
A minimum rate of tax assumes uniformity of the base for the tax and the uniform administration 
of the tax. Each step toward such uniformity requires nations to compromise their tax 
sovereignty and accept a compromise position that may accommodate or follow another nation’s 
tax rules. The ideal way to guarantee that uniformity of rules and administration would be a 
single international agency to administer the common rules with powers to operate independently 
of national borders. Measurement of income under uniform substantive and procedural rules is 
essential but determination of income source or taxpayer residence would become matters of 
revenue distribution not tax collection. The international agency may collect the taxes and 
distribute them among nations under an internationally determined formula that is not dependent 
on determination of income source or residence.220
Much sovereignty is at stake in the BEPS and GLoBE projects but voluntary relinquishment of 
sovereignty is not novel. Neither does it represent a radical change from historic practices during 
the 20th century. Following World War I, the League of Nations emerged as a mechanism for 
international cooperation and resolution of disputes that would avert future wars. It failed, of 
course, but the United Nations (“UN”) followed the next world war. UN peacekeeping 
217 Supra part III. 
218 Supra note 119 (inclusive framework). 
219 Supra note 193 (discussing the potential manipulation of factors in a formulary apportionment method). 
220 Part VI. infra, addresses the development of an international tax revenue, distribution formula.  
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interventions have prevented some wars221 but the UN has not spoken with sufficient authority to 
supplant sovereign decision-making that threatens peaceful intercourse among nations.  
Common economic interests have been somewhat more successful in securing international 
cooperation. The World Trade Organization,222 for example, promotes international trade and 
provides a forum for resolution of trade disputes.223 Even the US has acquiesced in adverse 
decisions of the WTO concerning anti-competitive practices and impermissible subsidies: 
Boeing, for example.224 Both the EU, which began as an economic community to regulate and 
promote trade for the benefit of its members,225 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(“USSR”)226 were created during the twentieth century. Each required ethnically and 
linguistically discrete countries to cede more or less voluntarily considerable economic 
independence to secure improved economic and trade relations beneficial for all member states. 
Central planning in the USSR, government control over many aspects of daily life, slow 
economic growth, and restrictions on individual liberties contributed to the eventual failure of the 
USSR model227 while limited central government control, protections of individual liberties and 
national, as opposed to union, independence in many non-trade related functions has worked 
with considerable success in the EU model. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU228 and dissention 
with respect to several primarily non-economic or trade issues including immigration229 indicates 
221 UN Peacekeeping, Our Successes, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-successes (last visited June 18, 2020); UN 
Peacekeeping, Mano River Basin, 25 Years of Peacekeeping,  https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mano-river-basin-25-
years-of-peacekeeping (last visited June 18, 2020). 
222 World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm
(last visited July 10, 2020). 
223 Martin Vallespinos, Can the WTO Stop the Race to the Bottom? Tax Competition and the WTO, 40 VA. TAX 
REV. (2020) (forthcoming) (arguing that the WTO should police tax concessions because they impact trade). 
224 European Commission, WTO Boeing dispute: EU issues preliminary list of U.S. products considered for 
countermeasures, (April 17, 2019) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2162; Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, U.S. Notifies Full Compliance in WTO Aircraft Dispute, (May 6, 2020) 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/may/us-notifies-full-compliance-wto-
aircraft-dispute. See also World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement DS108: United States - Tax Treatment for 
“Foreign Sales Corporations”, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm
(last visited June 22, 2020) (the U.S. repealed the grandfather provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act and the 
ETI Act that were subject to compliance proceedings); World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement DS58: United 
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm (last visited June 22, 2020).  
225 EUROPEAN UNION, The History of the European Union, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en
(last visited June 18, 2020) (the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community in 1957).  
226 Generally, Encyclopædia Brittanica, Soviet Union, https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union (visited July 
27, 2020). 
227 Numa Mazat, Structural Analysis of the Economic Decline and Collapse of the Soviet Union, ANPEC (2016) 
https://www.anpec.org.br/encontro/2015/submissao/files_I/i3-186e370d13d34b7043cb737da8d75390.pdf.
228 EUR-Lex, Brexit – UK’s Withdrawal from the EU, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/content/news/Brexit-UK-
withdrawal-from-the-eu.html (last visited June 18, 2020). 
229 Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 60/20, (May 14, 2020) Lexumbourg 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-05/cp200060en.pdf  (The placing of asylum seekers 
or third-country nationals who are the subject of a return decision in the Röszke transit zone at the Serbian-
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that the EU model may require adjustments for it to endure permanently without loss of 
additional member states. Nevertheless, the willingness of nations to acquiesce in the authority 
of an international and voluntary administrative body to promote common economic interests 
exists. On a small scale, five economic powers have joined in a combined effort to reduce tax 
evasion.230
In many countries, business interests, politicians, and the populace generally regularly malign the 
taxing agencies while simultaneously looking to the taxing agency to subsidize the activities and 
interests they favor. In the US, even members of Congress refer to the tax laws as the “IRS 
code,”231 implicitly assigning responsibility for taxation to the administrative agency as if it, and 
not the legislature, were responsible for the tax laws that the agency must enforce. Congress and 
other national legislatures have grown accustomed to delivering indirect subsidies through the 
tax law rather than directly subsidizing activities and interests.232 While the international taxing 
agency enforcing internationally uniform tax rules under uniform administrative procedures and 
standards might continue to be a subject of derision, it would remove taxation from the domestic 
political sphere to allow it to serve its primary function of raising the revenue necessary to 
operate governments, rather than as an indirect source of funding for private activities.233 By 
separating taxation from domestic politics, international uniformity diminishes the opportunism 
of targeted tax subsidies and requires discussion of budgeting for a subsidy with a direct 
expenditure rather than the current indirect delivery through decreased tax liability. Many tax 
subsidies currently are opportunistic. They result from exertion of influence by limited interests 
and appear in statutory language that is deceptively general despite being targeted to the 
influential interests.234 Changing tax rules under an internationalized system to subsidize specific 
Hungarian border must be classified as ‘detention’); Pablo Gorondi, Hungary’s Orban Critical of EU Leaders on 
Migration, Economy, AP NEWS (July 27, 2019), https://apnews.com/b89e682583014c7e8a1bf1cbb46e5dcf.  
230 IRS, Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement, available at https://www.irs.gov/compliance/joint-chiefs-of-global-
tax-enforcement (last visited July 14, 2020).
231 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Who wrote the ‘IRS code’? Hint: It wasn’t the Internal Revenue Service, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (April 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/04/13/who-
wrote-the-irs-code-hint-it-wasnt-the-internal-revenue-service/ (politicized, anti-tax use of the IRS Code 
terminology).
232 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., Tax Expenditures, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/tax-policy/tax-
expenditures#:~:text=Tax%20expenditures%20are%20defined%20by,exceptions%20may%20be%20viewed%20as
(last visited July 10, 2020) (defining and identifying tax, as opposed to direct expenditures, includes tables).
233 Id.
234 I.R.C. § § 1400Z-1, 1400Z-2 (2018) (Opportunity Zones); TAXNOTES, Lawmakers Question Mnuchin on Possible 
Opportunity Zone Abuse, (June 24, 2020) https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/opportunity-
zones/lawmakers-question-mnuchin-possible-opportunity-zone-
abuse/2020/06/25/2cnd8?highlight=opportunity%20zones (Subcommittee on Economic and Consumer Policy 
raising concern that developers were receiving tax breaks due to designation as low-income communities despite not 
seemingly meeting the statutory requirements, and that the Treasury may have simply acted as a rubber stamp); 
Brett Theodos, Jorge Gonzalez, Brady Meixwell, The Opportunity Zone Incentive Isn’t Living Up to Its Equitable 
Development Goals. Here Are Four Ways to Improve It, URBAN WIRE (June 17, 2020) 
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/opportunity-zone-incentive-isnt-living-its-equitable-development-goals-here-are-
four-ways-improve-it.  
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business interests would require international agreement and is likely to be far less common that 
such subsidies are now.235
Uniform taxation of income without regard to source and divorced from the distribution of the 
centrally collected tax revenue among nations eliminates the need for bilateral or multilateral tax 
treaties and TIEAs except for the general agreement to be part of the unified tax system and to 
acquiesce in the distribution formula. Where a taxpayer earns income will no longer determine to 
which government the income is attributable and may tax the income. Income from intangible 
property that currently is so abstract and challenging to source ceases to be so. If there is income, 
it is taxable under the uniform rules of taxation. If sourcing continues to be problematic because 
outlier jurisdictions do not join in the centralized taxing regime, sourcing rules would broaden to 
include a range of connections – property, labor, revenue (direct or indirect) and residence of 
owners or beneficiaries. A taxpayer would be free from the agency’s taxing jurisdiction only if 
they did nothing directly or indirectly outside the residence jurisdiction that has not joined the 
centralized tax regime, and the outlier country would receive no part of the centrally collected 
tax revenue. An investment in any country that is part of the unified taxing agency collection by 
an entity based in a non-cooperating jurisdiction would be a sufficient connection with the 
unified taxing jurisdiction to render the income from the investment taxable by the unified 
agency.  
Constructing uniform rules and assembling agreement will be a formidable task but the project 
would have the virtue of binding uniformity that current international projects lack.236 When a 
country signs on to the agreement, it has little room to manipulate the rules since it will delegate 
tax administration and collection to the independent international agency in which all countries 
are represented.237 Robust related party rules will limit the ability of taxpayers to arbitrage 
progressive rates with multiple entities.238 Universal tax transparency so that a single tax would 
be imposed at ultimate ownership level might be most sensible but perhaps too difficult to 
administer.239 Mechanisms for broad-based information reporting by financial institutions, 
vendors and business consumers are critical to enforcement and a more extensive withholding 
system than currently in place in most countries certainly would facilitate accurate reporting. 
Perhaps most important would be an international, public education effort so that taxpayers 
235 The tax expenditure list for 2020 has 172 items. Treasury, Tax Expenditures, supra note 232 at 2020 pdf link. 
236 Supra part III. 
237 Compare the international agency structure in Ordower, Utopian Visions, supra note 35 at 375 -378. 
238 Compare I.R.C. §318 (constructive ownership rules); I.R.C. §267(b) (related parties for loss denial); and many 
other such provisions using a variety of thresholds for treating otherwise separate individuals or entities as having 
common interests that limit tax separation. 
239 Extensive tax transparency exists in the U.S. as the income of partnerships and limited liability companies under 
I.R.C. §701, electing S corporations under I.R.C. §1361, and various non-US entities that elect under treas. reg. 
§301.7701-3 is taxable only to the underlying owners. Commentators, including the author of this article, Henry 
Ordower, Preserving the Corporate Tax Base through Tax Transparency, 71 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 993 – 97 
(9/9/2013), have recommended full tax transparency for corporations. Modified transparency also exists for 
regulated investment companies, I.R.C. §851 et seq., and real estate investment trusts, I.R.C. §857 et seq. 
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worldwide receive identical and accurate messages concerning the benefits of the global system, 
its uniformity, and its system for currency translation to achieve economic uniformity to address 
hyper-inflationary currencies. Supplemental to the global system and beneficial to worldwide 
economic stabilization that should follow from the distribution formula would be currency 
exchange rate stabilization and possible transition to a single international currency. 
For MNEs a single tax collector and single computation would be likely as well to facilitate 
transition to a uniform international accounting and reporting system to replace the awkward 
reporting split between the generally accepted accounting principles240 that the US uses and the 
international financial accounting standards in use in much of the remainder of the world.241 The 
US finally might transition to IFRS as the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed242
only to step back from finalizing a plan in 2015.243
PART VI. REVENUE SHARES 
One virtue of global tax administration under uniform tax rules is that taxpayers are left with no 
place to hide from paying taxes. Taxation under this system is borderless. Tax planners 
undoubtedly will continue to seek, and perhaps occasionally discover, opportunities to diminish 
their clients’ tax liability, but borderless uniformity ideally eliminates all opportunity to reduce 
taxes by redirecting income or income producing activity to other jurisdictions. Globally 
centralized determination and collection of tax likewise precludes local political decision-making 
from impacting tax liability and delivering benefits through the tax system.  
The premise that a fundamental concept of fair taxation exists free from political determinants 
underlies common global tax collection under uniform rules. “Fair share” becomes a global 
rather than domestic concept. Each taxpayer should pay their “fair share” relative to global, not 
relative to national, revenue needs. A global “fair share” concept recognizes that even economic 
activity that may seem local is not. Rather, global economic and social interdependency emerges 
as the ultimate marker of the 21st century. The 2020 pandemic,244 worldwide commercial 
branding and manufacturing,245 international terrorism246 and cross-border intrusion into 
240 ACCOUNTING.COM, What is GAAP?, 
https://www.accounting.com/resources/gaap/#:~:text=Generally%20accepted%20accounting%20principles%2C%2
0or,approved%20accounting%20methods%20and%20practices (last visited July 10, 2020).  




242 AICPA, SEC Unanimously Approves Exposing Proposed IFRS Roadmap for Public Comment, (August 27, 
2008), https://www.ifrs.com/updates/sec/SEC_approves.html.
243 Michael Cohn, SEC Commissioner Rejects IFRS, ACCOUNTINGTODAY (Mar. 30, 2015), 
https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/sec-commissioner-rejects-ifrs
244 Supra note 50.
245Claire Matthews, What is the Secret to McDonald’s Global Branding Success, Masitro (Nov. 5, 2014) 
https://www.maistro.com/procurement/secret-mcdonalds-global-branding-success/ (McDonalds ranked the 6th most 
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elections and the political process247 are only a few of the many elements that demonstrate how 
inextricably intertwined nations have become.  
The impetus to the OECD Action plans,248 the EU’s list of tax haven jurisdictions,249 and 
FATCA in the US250 is, however, a more limited and domestic thesis. The thesis is that MNEs 
and other taxpayers misdirect some of their income to low tax jurisdictions to avoid paying the 
amount of income tax they should pay into the treasuries of major developed economies. Under 
that thesis, the notion of fair taxation is relative and location specific. It is valid only insofar as it 
defines the amount a taxpayer should pay to a specific developed nation’s treasury. The OECD 
framework purports to be more global251 but it emphasizes capturing additional revenue for the 
treasuries of the developed economies. Failing enhancement of tax revenue for those developed 
economies, the OECD’s leading member nations might lose interest in collecting additional tax 
from the MNEs targeted by the BEPS Actions.  
Rule uniformity and central global tax collection postulates an alternative to the location specific 
thesis expressed in the preceding paragraph. The alternative thesis is more abstract and 
independent of location. It detects the existence of a common view of a global responsibility to 
provide each individual with sufficient resources to secure a decent standard of living. Whether 
that view arises from a universal human value system that demands a just world without poverty 
or from a sense of self-preservation that foresees physical and economic risks to those with 
wealth from those who are impoverished,252 the thesis requires that each taxpayer pay a correct 
amount of tax that depends on the taxpayer’s characteristics. Those characteristics might include 
the taxpayer’s ability to pay measured under the common standard of the taxpayer’s income from 
important brand); Sean Galea-Pace, Inside Adisas’ Supply Chain, Supply Chain, 
https://www.supplychaindigital.com/supply-chain/inside-adidas-supply-chain (last visited June 29, 2020) (adidas 
works with 700 independent manufacturers in over 50 countries).  
246 Pamela Engel and Ellen Loanes, What Happened on 9/11, 18 Years Ago, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sep. 10, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/what-happened-on-911-why-2016-9; FBI, History, Famous Cases & Criminals, 
Pan Am 103 Bombing, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/pan-am-103-bombing (last visited June 23, 2020); 
Simon Burton, 50 Stunning Olympic Moments No 26: The Terrorist Outrage in Munich in 1972, THE GUARDIAN
(May 2, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2012/may/02/50-stunning-olympic-moments-munich-72.  
247 Intelligence Community Assessment, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, (Jan. 6, 
2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3719492/Read-the-declassified-report-on-Russian.pdf (Russia 
influenced the 2016 Presidential campaign to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, with a 
preference to elect President Trump); Joshua Kurlantzick, How China is Interfering in Taiwan’s Election, CFR 
(Nov. 7, 2019) https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-china-interfering-taiwans-election. 
248 Part III supra.
249 Supra note 19. 
250 Supra note 25. 
251 Supra note 131 at 28-29 (tax incentives may be redundant in developing countries and the GLoBE proposal could 
instead enable them to effectively tax returns on investment made in their countries).  
252 United Nations General Assembly 86th Meeting, Links between Extreme Poverty, Violent Extremism Can Be 
Broken by Creating Jobs, Reducing Inequalities, General Assembly Hears as Debate Concludes, (Feb. 16, 2016),  
https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11761.doc.htm; Ian Black, Poverty driving Syrian men and boys into the arms 
of Isis, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/may/04/poverty-
driving-syrian-men-and-boys-into-the-arms-of-isis.  
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all sources worldwide as compared with all other taxpayers. Under such a thesis, the major 
developed economies might support collection of that fair share even if the additional tax does 
not augment their governmental coffers.  
Both the OECD Actions and FATCA are designed to generate additional tax revenue by 
redirecting income from its artificial location in a low tax jurisdiction to its correct location in a 
higher taxed, major developed economy. Neither the OECD Actions nor FATCA favors one 
higher tax jurisdiction over another insofar as neither redirects the incidence of taxation as long 
as the rate imposed is sufficiently high. For example, the BEPS actions would not redirect 
income from the Netherlands to Germany because both countries impose a sufficiently high rate 
of tax, but BEPS might redirect income from Ireland to Germany because the Irish corporate rate 
is only 12.5 percent. Similarly, FATCA might include income from offshore investments in a US 
taxpayer’s income but, except under unusual circumstances where the tax is payable to a 
diplomatically restricted country,253 would allow the US taxpayer a credit for the tax paid to the 
other jurisdiction.254 A common international taxing system with uniform rules and 
administration similarly will produce more income tax revenue than is generated worldwide if 
current developed economy rates apply. Estimates of the amount of additional revenue vary both 
with rates and assumptions.255 The amount of additional tax revenue from preventing profit 
shifting256 or reducing the tax gap257 is not trivial even if speculative.258 While developed 
economies do use their tax systems politically to deliver a considerable array of incentives, it 
nevertheless would seem to be in their interests to join a borderless tax consortium to promote 
fair and even-handed taxation of all participants in the economy and to augment global tax 
revenue production. Political quibbling among advanced economies, of course, might stymie 
agreement as it has on adopting even a simple measure like the CCCTB.259
With limited exceptions for a few developed economies like Ireland260 that use their tax rates and 
structures to attract foreign investment, the countries that rely most heavily on tax rates and 
253 I.R.C. § 901(j). 
254 I.R.C. § 901 (foreign tax credit). 
255 OECD, Tax Challenges, supra note 106. 
256 Devereaux, et al., supra note 20 (providing very incomplete estimates of revenue lost to base erosion and profit 
shifting from the digital economy in the $10 billion plus range). 
257 IRS, The Tax Gap, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/the-tax-gap (last visited July 10, 2020) (estimating a broad 
non-compliance measure for 2010-11 of nearly $500 billion); Frank J. Bevvino & Robert A. Page, The Tax Gap: A 
Competing Values Model, 167 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 997 (2020). 
258 Clausing, Kimberly A., The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United States and Beyond
(June 17, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685442 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2685442; 
and for the GLoBE Project, Devereaux, et al., supra note 20. 
259 Supra note 21. 
260 Ireland’s 12.5 percent corporate tax rate has enabled it to capture international headquarters of companies 
interested in minimal taxes on their European income from intangibles, including Starbucks and Apple. Ireland 
Revenue, Corporation Tax,  https://www.revenue.ie/en/companies-and-charities/corporation-tax-for-
companies/corporation-tax/index.aspx (last visited July 10, 2020). Tom Bergin, Special Report: How Starbucks 
avoids UK Taxes, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2012), https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-britain-starbucks-tax/special-report-
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concessions to attract investment fall into two broad groups. One group consists of countries 
with many poor, often absolutely poor, residents. Those countries look to international 
investment for basic development of infrastructure and provision of human essentials and jobs.261
They tend to lack strong bargaining power for international investment and readily offer 
privileges, including freedom from taxation, to international investors. A second group of 
countries are the more traditional tax haven countries, frequently island jurisdictions, with 
developed business or investment servicing infrastructures but without substantial tax revenue 
needs to carry their infrastructures. Some of the group have significant tourist industries and 
raise revenue through consumption taxes like hotel and meal taxes targeted at tourists. The issue 
for a borderless uniform income tax is how to attract those countries to join the tax consortium. 
For countries that rely on their low tax structure to capture international investment, the revenue 
distribution formula under a borderless uniform tax has to make them better situated than they 
are relying on tax incentives to attract investment. An initial offer of all incremental revenue 
from the change to the borderless tax under an international tax administrator would be a good 
place to begin. Developed economies before the economic downturn from the 2020 pandemic 
have been able to maintain and perhaps even expand their own infrastructures, including welfare 
benefit networks that address relative poverty in developed countries. While no nation admits it 
can maintain the best that it ever had without a steady increase in tax revenue, such revenue 
increases have been difficult to find. Anti-tax sentiment in many places has contributed to the 
political unwillingness of legislatures to increase rates of tax. Decreased rates to meet 
international tax competition and political pressure to deliver subsidies through the tax system 
have been more common. As much as developed economies may hope for additional revenue 
from successful international agreements to reign in base erosion and profit shifting, those 
economies have not budgeted for increased revenue from BEPS or any other international 
project. Thus, the incremental revenue from borderless taxation is uncommitted and could be 
devoted to international development, elimination of absolute poverty and improved control of 
worldwide health threats.  
The plan might suffice to persuade those non-affluent nations to cease trading low taxes for 
international investment and to join the universal tax consortium. The commitment from 
centralized taxation could make many nations less desperate for revenue than they are today and 
place them in an improved bargaining position with international investors. Relatively low wages 
and natural resources would leave many attractive for international investment and those that are 
not would have greater revenue needs and would get a larger share of the international tax 
revenue pool. Private, short-term selfish interests might stop being the primary driver of 
development, enabling those countries to identify and remedy their most acute needs. 
how-starbucks-avoids-uk-taxes-idUKBRE89E0EX20121015; Foo Yun Chee, Apple Spars with EU as $14 Billion 
Irish Tax Dispute Drags on, REUTERS (Sep. 18, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-apple-stateaid/apple-
spars-with-eu-as-14-billion-irish-tax-dispute-drags-on-idUSKBN1W31FE.
261 Supra notes 210 - 212 and accompanying text.
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Improvement of living conditions worldwide might likewise increase consumption and income 
that would yield even more tax revenue. Rather than devoting that revenue to bulking up the 
treasuries of the developed economies, the international consortium should be willing to commit 
that revenue to international development, thereby enhancing the resources of the less developed 
and developing world countries and broadening the consumer base in the more distant future.262
Other traditionally low tax jurisdictions like tax havens might be more difficult to enlist if they 
customarily offer low tax rates to enhance international investment servicing business and do not 
have governmental revenue needs. For those countries, coercion may be essential. Since the 
borderless system would be independent of income sourcing, those jurisdictions no longer would 
be able to offer international investors freedom from taxation on their investment assets. Most 
investors would have a sufficient connection with one or more of the consortium countries to 
provide a basis upon which to tax their income under the borderless system. Historical tax haven 
economies simply would lose the benefit of offering low taxes.263
Since the global tax will increase tax revenue, distribution initially should follow a two-step 
formula. The first step would hold each country harmless from tax revenue loss so that each 
country following transition receives a share of tax revenue equal to its revenue from income tax 
in the preceding year or over a rolling average of years, possibly adjusted for inflation. The 
second step would require a needs assessment under which nutrition, housing, education, 
healthcare and infrastructure needs of less developed countries would be evaluated and a plan 
developed to ameliorate deficits in all categories worldwide. The UN has projects on some 
aspects of need already, including hunger.264 Remaining revenue would be devoted to the 
gradual elimination of those deficits -- perhaps addressing life-threatening deficits first followed 
by improvement of living standards everywhere. Amelioration costs would vary widely since 
they will remain a function of relative local cost of goods and labor.  
The method of distributing the incremental revenue may prove more challenging than 
determining the amount to distribute to each country. Significant regional variations of need 
contribute to determination of the amount but distribution through national or regional 
governments and agencies requires a national or local commitment to deploy the funds as 
intended. Local corruption is likely to remain an impediment to the intended development and 
262 Nathaniel Hendren and Ben Sprung-Keyser, A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies., 135 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1209 (2020) (empirical analysis demonstrating that in the US government 
programs to assist low income children and less so adults yield more revenue in the long term than they cost). 
263 Some retreat in tax haven investment management business followed a change in U.S. tax law in 1997 that eased 
the need for actual management activity in the tax haven to avoid the incidence of the U.S. income tax on foreign 
investors. I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(B)(ii), as amended in 1997 (permitting investment discretion to be exercised in the 
U.S.). 
264UN, Sustainable Development Programs, Goal 2: Zero Hunger, 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/hunger/ (last visited July 10, 2020), For all 17 development goals, 
including health, education, clean water, and climate actions, see UN, Sustainable Development Programs, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html (last visited June 23, 2020).  
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retard progress toward elimination of absolute poverty. Direct international control of 
deployment of funds might be the best solution but would require further relinquishment of 
national sovereignty and quite possibly endanger international willingness to engage in the 
borderless tax project. Such control goes well beyond the economically beneficial strategy of a 
uniform, borderless tax. It would prove even more difficult to persuade nations to yield control 
over national revenue deployment than to persuade them to become part of the borderless 
collection system. International control over resource distribution intrudes further upon national 
self-determination. The global pressure to join a worldwide tax consortium and subscribe to a 
fair tax and distribution formula might serve to moderate corruption where it becomes clear that 
corruption is impeding intended distribution to diminish the incidence of local poverty.  
The borderless system affords an opportunity to deploy a portion of the tax revenue to fund a 
universal basic income (“UBI”). One country, several non-governmental agencies and various 
governmental units have experimented with differing permutations of a UBI.265 Some UBIs are 
means tested while others simply distribute a basic sum to each individual. The means-tested, 
recovery rebates under the CARES266 in the US are a limited form of UBI.267 US Democratic 
presidential primary candidate Andrew Yang included a UBI in his platform.268 Commentators 
have recommended a universal basic income within national borders to eliminate poverty and 
distribute welfare while respecting the dignity and autonomy of the individual.269 Some 
opponents of a UBI worry that free money will disincentivize work but evidence from existing 
experiments with UBI does not support that conclusion.270
Insofar as the uniform global tax requires taxpayers to report directly to the international taxing 
agency without the intermediation of any national government, the agency has the direct contact 
necessary to distribute funds to individuals. If the borderless tax system includes everyone, 
without regard to income, in its database, it would be a relatively simple matter for the agency to 
distribute funds directly to those whose incomes fall below a geographically determined 
minimum amount. Such a system might be less intrusive on national sovereignty than other types 
of control over funds, as the distributions would be independent of national borders and tied only 
265 Sigal Samuel, Everywhere basic income has been tried, in one map, VOX (Feb. 19, 2020),  
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2020/2/19/21112570/universal-basic-income-ubi-map. 
266 Supra, note 42. 
267 The payments of $1200 per individual plus $500 per qualifying child were uniform to all residents with income 
of $75,000 or less in either of the two preceding tax years. Section 2201 of the CARES Act adding I.R.C. § 6428. 
268 Matt Stevens and Isabella Grullón Paz, Andrew Yang’s $1,000-a-Month Idea May Have Seemed Absurd Before. 
Not Now., NEW YORK TIMES (March 18, 2020),  https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/politics/universal-basic-
income-andrew-yang.html.
269 Ari Glogower and Clint Wallace, Shades of Basic Income, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3122146 (2017); 
Usman Chohan, Universal Basic Income: A Review, Discussion Paper Series, (Aug. 2017) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3013634; Isabel Ortiz, et al., Basic Income Proposals in Light 
of ILO Standards: Key Issues and Global Costing, Extension of Social Security Working Paper No. 62, (2018) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3208737.
270 Samuel, supra note 265.   
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to the local cost of living and having little to do with any characteristic that might be specific to 
any country. It is likely, for example, that in many instances, especially those that may be 
historically arbitrary, two individuals living a short distance apart on opposite sides of a border 
will have more similar costs of living than two individuals living at a great distance from one 
another in the same country.271 The UBI could supplement direct distribution to national 
governments yet remain substantially free from the risk of loss through governmental corruption.  
PART VII: CONCLUSION
This article proposes an international tax agency to administer a uniform borderless income tax 
under uniform tax rules. It complements an earlier international tax agency proposal that would 
have apportioned the income tax base, also determined under substantially uniform rules, among 
nations to give a more meaningful share of the base to less developed producing economies.272
This proposal expands the basic concept to collect tax revenue centrally and distribute it among 
nations as it is needed. Needs for developed economies would include the maintenance of their 
existing infrastructures including welfare, while needs for less developed economies would 
include basic needs of the populace – food, shelter, clothing, healthcare and education. The 
proposal is aspirational of course but designed to induce readers to think more globally about 
basic needs and ask questions like: what should my serendipitously wealthy nation be willing to 
renounce so that my poor nation neighbor may provide essential services to its populace? The 
concept of borderless taxation for many is utopian, for others, who maintain, for example, that 
competition and sovereignty are essential to economic advancement and to prevent sloth, 
dystopian. 
271 Compare the commonality of culture example of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and El Paso, Texas in Brassey & 
Ordower, supra note 43. 
272  Ordower, Utopian Visions, supra note 38. 
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